380 W. R. LAWSON 



The colossal gambles which follow each other so rapidly in 

 Wall street and in the "grain pit" must shake confidence in 

 the whole commercial system which permits them. Whether 

 they be inseparable from it or not, they threaten serious dis- 

 aster to it sooner or later. They are even more ominous than 

 the trusts, for the latter may plead that union is strength, 

 but colossal gambles can end only in panics. The gamblers 

 themselves are perfectly aware of that, and it is amusing 

 to see how jealously they watch each other when any 

 alarm of a perilous "deal" is afloat. Formerly the greatest 

 exploit that a Wall street filibuster could achieve was 

 a "corner" of some kind. It was the crown of his ambition, 

 like the role of Hamlet to a budding tragedian. But now the 

 bare mention of a corner sends a cold shiver through Wall 

 street. It begets terrible visions of a house of cards tumbling 

 about one's ears. So terrifying is the prospect it conjures 

 up that the banks, as soon as they hear of one being attempted, 

 launch a vigorous remonstrance at the cornerers. This ac- 

 tually occurred not long ago — in fact, about the beginning 

 of 1902. The episode was afterwards described by the actor 

 in chief, John W. Gates. To an interviewer he made the 

 following ingenuous confession: 



"On the Louisville we had the opinions of the best ex- 

 perts and auditors in the country that it was worth more per 

 share than the Illinois Central. Before we started we knew 

 there were $25,000,000 quick cash assets in the treasury; but 

 the public did not know that. We started knowing the actual 

 intrinsic value of the company and its exact physical condi- 

 tion, and we had the reports of the auditors on its financial 

 condition. 



"When we obtained 306,000 shares — the amount we 

 started out to get — there was a short interest of 150,000 

 shares, of which 100,000 shares were the foreign short inter- 

 est and 50,000 were stock that August Belmont had sold 

 under a resolution of the board authorizing its sale. These 

 50,000 shares were not good delivery for thirty days, and if 

 we had called the stock and insisted upon the specific per- 

 formance of the contracts, as we had every right to do, we 

 could have caused a panic greater than the May panic. 



