APPENDIX II 



Memorandum as to the Evacuation of Egypt 



The evacuation of Egypt is a question partly of honour, partly of pru- 

 dence. Of honour, in view of the pledges given; of prudence on military 

 grounds. 



If Egypt could be held honourably and without risk of war, there is 

 much to be said in favour of continuing the English protectorate. It se- 

 cures our Mediterranean route to India at a small cost. Its prestige to us 

 is of value, and we should be spared the discredit of a withdrawal under 

 French pressure. We owe it, too, to the Egyptians, whose army and polit- 

 ical aspirations we destroyed in 1882, to continue to them our assistance 

 in their weakness as against other Powers. 



Nevertheless the risks appear to me great. Egypt's position on the 

 Suez Isthmus is too important geographically to be allowed permanently 

 to any one European Power by the rest of the Powers. It stands marked 

 out for neutrality as between them, and France will certainly not consent 

 to our holding it permanently without a war. As a question of near dan- 

 ger I have reason to feel sure that a complete agreement has been come to 

 between France and the Sultan (probably, too, the Czar) regarding it, 

 and that the return of the Liberal Party to office in England will determine 

 their joint action. 



It is therefore of some urgency to consider whether we are strong 

 enough by land and sea to refuse at all hazards. 



I agree entirely with Mr. Gladstone when he hopes that Lord Salisbury 

 rather than himself may negotiate the evacuation. Mr. Gladstone's posi- 

 tion abroad will be weak, as he will be without cordial support from the 

 Central Powers, while his position in honour towards France will be ham- 

 pered by his many pledges. Lord Salisbury could get better terms for the 

 Egyptians, and would be less likely to sacrifice them to the exigencies of 

 European diplomacy. 



I believe an evacuation might be effected on one or other of the fol- 

 lowing lines: 



(1) The simplest and most expeditious plan would probably be to hand 

 over the military responsibility to the Sultan. This would have the advan- 

 tage of postponing the ultimate question. It woidd place Egypt, as regards 

 European ambitions, under whatever degree of integrity the Ottoman Em- 

 pire enjoys. Ottoman troops could certainly guard her southern frontier 

 and prevent surprise from other quarters. England, this quarrel about 

 Egypt settled, would then revert to her former friendly relations with Tur- 

 key, and in the event of a break-up of the Empire would be free to take 



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