MY SOMALI BOOK 251 



presume to express a decided opinion upon that policy, 

 but in view of the fact that in some quarters it has 

 been unreservedly condemned, it may be as well to 

 point out that there are two sides to the question. 



The origin of all the troubles in Somaliland has been 

 the arms traffic by means of which Abyssinia has 

 become filled with rifles and ammunition from the 

 French ports of Jibuti and Obok. It was the inability 

 of the Southern Somali tribes to resist the raids and 

 oppression of the well-armed Abyssinians, followed by 

 the extension of the traffic by land into Southern 

 Somaliland, that indirectly led to the rise of the " Mad 

 Mullah." If, when we first undertook responsibilities 

 in Somaliland, we had constructed a light ^iiilway into 

 the Interior, or had even done so when Mahomed 

 AbduUa first appeared on the horizon as a star of some 

 magnitude, we might have been able to deal with him 

 effectively. As things were we tried, and though we 

 succeeded in teaching him that we were a power to 

 be reckoned with, failed to crush him, while the 

 eventual agreement by which he professed to recog- 

 nise the suzerainty of the Italian Government was 

 little more than a farce. 



It is probable that, seeing we had no intention of 

 actively administering the Protectorate, we made a 

 mistake in ever advancing beyond the coast-line. 

 Be this as it may, the maintenance of posts in the 

 Interior, with a military force to hold the Mullah more 

 or less in check, was an expensive and unprofitable 

 business, and always likely to lead us into another 

 contest with that personage when next he saw fit to 

 become aggressive. While to crush him once for all 



