THE INDIVIDUALITY OF ANTHROPOLOGY 491 



we may look for a rigid demonstration. The arrangement of the 

 sciences and their mutual relations are logical results determined 

 by the relations of things among themselves and with our reason. 

 It is* precisely on this account that the Congress of St. Louis claims 

 a special and highly philosophic interest. In this Congress the 

 sciences are rightly considered in the same manner as the facts 

 pertaining to each are dealt with in their turn. The Congress is, 

 practically, a convention of the natural history of the sciences. 



Just as each science deals with the classification of the pheno- 

 mena of matter and forces, so the philosophy of the sciences deals 

 with the classification of sciences. Just as there are properties of 

 matter and force, the recognition of which notably favors the in- 

 troductory study of all phenomena or of all substance embraced in 

 a known series, can we not also conceive of a series of the sciences 

 possessing all of these general properties and containing a place 

 reserved in some sort of way for anthropology? 



As it is, the logical conclusion is the more clear that such series 

 are but two in number, comprising all our knowledge of the uni- 

 verse, and that anthropology does not enter the same series more 

 than the various sciences from which it is separable with difficulty. 

 Moreover, these two series form a division so natural and well- 

 grounded that, even in our day, and as it has ever since the begin- 

 ning of the formation of sciences, it operates without constraint. 



The double aspect under which nature is presented to our in- 

 vestigation determines this mode of classification. If we consider 

 the natural phenomena by themselves, we obtain a knowledge of 

 the general laws concerning the relations of phenomena among 

 themselves. The various sciences, thus arranged, form a series 

 of general sciences. This series, a natural arrangement which re- 

 views philosophical history, represents (as Auguste Comte has 

 shown) the sum total of our knowledge, in compact form, as seen 

 from the purely ontological side. Such learning regulates the know- 

 ledge of beings, but does not suffice to constitute that knowledge. 



In fact, we find that the phenomena of various kinds associate 

 and combine themselves, in a manifold way, in beings of all kinds. 

 In other words, there is much for us to know, for these complex 

 forces act upon us, and, conversely, we are obliged to react toward 

 them. So the knowledge of the simplest being requires the com- 

 bination of many general sciences and a study suited to the par- 

 ticular nature of that being or object. That is why the series 

 of general sciences required the recognition of our knowledge 

 of beings in a complementary series, none the less indispensable 

 than the former in the control of our reactions toward the en- 

 vironment. 



In evidence thereof it may suffice to present a list of the arts, 



