578 MENTAL SCIENCE 



lean Wundt, in a thoroughly and sometimes radically reconstructed 

 and improved edition; Baldwin, the first here to attempt a logic of 

 biology and sociology and evolution that should apply to genetic 

 psychology; Dewey, who, much as he achieved in logic and general 

 psychology, has done perhaps yet more to make these topics fruitful 

 for education; Cattell, pioneer in founding two laboratories, the 

 foremost editor in our ranks, who has boldly grappled the vast 

 problem of individual psychology in a way which, if solved, must 

 make even biography more scientific; in other related fields Royce, 

 Ormond, Howison, Fullerton, Strong, who have done so much to 

 restore the faltering belief in soul, freedom, God, and ultimate reality; 

 Cowles, Donaldson, Myer, Hoch, Herrick, each marking advances 

 either in exploring the obscure psychoses of mental aberration, ad- 

 vancing our knowledge of the brain, correlating psychic symptoms 

 and neural and somatic changes, and making the asylum tributary 

 to science, these inadequate references, not to mention my own 

 associates, or even the score or two of younger men whose work 

 already gives promise of a future richer in results than the past, 

 and omitting, solely because I am too ignorant to speak of it, the 

 department of sociology, bracketed with ours to-day, but which 

 has also made advances perhaps hardly less signal, these suggest 

 my theme, which is simply a plea for yet more differentiation and 

 specialization between men, departments, and institutions, and cer- 

 tain modifications of method in our rapidly widening field. 



The idealist who holds that the world is man's concept and that 

 all science is a part of psychology can hardly object to the far more 

 modest claim that it really does properly include logic, ethics, 

 religion, esthetics, epistemology, and metaphysics ; and those who, 

 with Lotze, still cling to that dear old tradition of the theoretic life 

 that its supreme joy is to attain the fullest expression of one's own 

 personality in a comprehensive philosophical system, must not 

 carp if one who long since abandoned the youthful hope of attain- 

 ing this felicity vents his own individuality a little, as, with your 

 kind indulgence, I beg leave to do, excused somewhat by the con- 

 viction that all systems, the most meager and the best alike, are 

 only human documents, empirical data, votes, resumes, returns, to 

 be used at' last as empirical data for some greater synthesis of the 

 future. If psychology is already far more than a sub-department 

 of physiology, anthropology, and psychiatry, or a sub-section in 

 a philosophical system as of old, if we may justly reject for it the 

 place assigned it in the hierarchy of Comte and Spencer as a link 

 between biology and sociology, and now base it no less upon the 

 latter than upon the former, and not only claim for it an independ- 

 ence already achieved, but look forward to its ultimate hegemony 

 in all the fields involving man's higher nature, or as being in a word 



