CONCEPTIONS AND METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY 597 



define the nature of mind or consciousness. Further, I am not con- 

 vinced that psychology should be limited to the study of conscious- 

 ness as such, in so far as this can be set off from the physical world. 

 Psychology apart from consciousness is doubtless an absurdity, but 

 so also is mathematics or botany. I admire the products of the Her- 

 bartian school and the ever-increasing acuteness of introspective 

 analysis from Locke to Ward. All this forms an important chapter 

 in modern psychology; but the positive scientific results are small 

 in quantity when compared with the objective experimental work 

 accomplished in the past fifty years. There is no conflict between 

 introspective analysis and objective experiment on the contrary, 

 they should and do continually cooperate. But the rather widespread 

 notion that there is no psychology apart from introspection is 

 refuted by the brute argument of accomplished fact. 



It seems to me that most of the research work that has been 

 done by me or in my laboratory is nearly as independent of intro- 

 spection as work in physics or in zoology. The time of mental 

 processes, the accuracy of perception and movement, the range of 

 consciousness, fatigue, and practice, the motor accompaniments of 

 thought, memory, the association of ideas, the perception of space, 

 color-vision, preferences, judgments, individual differences, the 

 behavior of animals and of children, these and other topics I have 

 investigated without requiring the slightest introspection on the 

 part of the subject or undertaking such on my own part during 

 the course of the experiments. It is usually no more necessary for 

 the subject to be a psychologist than it is for the vivisected frog to 

 be a physiologist. 



James and Wundt agree in telling us that the experimental method 

 is chiefly of use as a servant of introspection; indeed, James says 

 that there is no " new psychology," " nothing but the old psychology 

 which began in Locke's time, plus a little physiology of the brain 

 and senses and theory of evolution, and a few refinements of intro- 

 spective detail." But our leaders in psychology have become our 

 leaders by belying such partial statements. Although neither Wundt 

 nor James has attempted any considerable experimental research, 

 yet we look up to them as the founders of modern psychology. 

 Wundt's original and laborious Physiologische Psychologic, the 

 Leipzig laboratory, and the Philosophische Studien have been in 

 large measure the foundation stones of experimental psychology. 

 The broad opportunistic treatment of James, instinct with genius 

 and fearless of logical inconsistency, has been of immense service 

 in freeing psychology from traditional fetters. I see no reason why 

 psychology, at least the psychology of twenty years ago, may not 

 be said to be the subjects treated in James's Principles of Psychology 



