THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 613 



The dogmatic movement in Germany had passed over into the 

 critical; and Kant had attempted a new esthetic reconciliation 

 of the dualism of inner and outer. The Kantian psychology or 

 anthropology is essentially a renewed subjectivism that is, so 

 far as it is "critical." Neither scientific naturalism, nor positivism 

 in the sense defined above, profited greatly from the work of Kant. 

 Indeed the explicit attempt to refute Hume to go no deeper - 

 throws the weight of Kant as authority on the side of an essen- 

 tially obscurantist attitude toward facts. Note the arguments 

 in favor of a priori space and time, which very little careful obser- 

 vation would have materially modified. And historically Kant 

 led the w r ay to what Hoffding calls the "romantic movement," 

 from Fichte to Hegel. 



Again in France an impulse was asserting itself away from the 

 materialism of the sensationalists toward the naturalism of Rous- 

 seau. Rousseau's recognition of the psychic involved a truer nat- 

 uralism than the view which denied the life of ideas and of all 

 higher functions in favor of a sense-process materialistically in- 

 terpreted. Neither Rousseau nor Condillac, however, combined 

 both the two postulates. 



In England a science of psychology was emerging at the open- 

 ing of the nineteenth century. Locke had broached a subjective 

 naturalism, which the French sensationalists, as I have just inti- 

 mated, developed on one side only. Hobbes was a positivist in 

 much the same sense for our purposes as Comte. But in David 

 Hume the two requirements of a true science of psychology were 

 consciously present. Hume treats mind as a part of nature, - 

 this is naturalism, and he also works at the problem of discov- 

 ering the laws of mental change by actual observation, this is 

 positivism. He is justified in both by his results; he is further 

 justified by his extraordinary historical influence. 



If then we are justified in saying that David Hume is one parent 

 of the science of psychology, in the sense of the word that places 

 this subject in line with the other natural sciences both as to its 

 material and to its method, then we have to look for the other 

 parent, I think, to France. Dropping the figure, we may say that, 

 in Rousseau, France contributed an essential moment to the de- 

 velopment of the science. Possibly this contribution should be 

 called the Rousseau-Comte factor; as possibly also the British 

 contribution should be called the Locke-Hume factor. 



The influence of the Rousseau-Comte factor, which is to-day 

 more undeveloped than the other, but is now becoming fertile, may 

 be shown by an appeal again to the analogy with the individual's 

 growth in personal self-consciousness. And as intimation of my 

 meaning, I may refer to the Rousseau-Comte motif as the "social" 



