614 PSYCHOLOGY 



or " collectivist," and to the Locke-Hume motif as the "personal" 

 or "individualistic." 



Taking up the genetic parallel, we may remark that the develop- 

 ment of the positivistic postulate by Locke, Hume, and the Mills, 

 in an individualistic sense, has proved inadequate, so far as it claims 

 to exhaust the psychic matter. In the development of the indi- 

 vidual the rise of the thought of a separate personal self is a late 

 outcome of reflection. The early stages of dualistic thought are 

 in so far social that the mind-body dualism is an abstraction in 

 both its terms. Mind is many minds; and body is many bodies. 

 The material of self is collective and distributive, not unitary nor 

 individual. The child thinks self as a term in a social situation. 



If this be true, the science of mind must be one in which the 

 abstraction of an isolated individual mental life is to be used 

 as an instrument of method rather than as a truth of analysis and 

 explanation. And there should be a science of psychology in 

 which the material is, so to speak, social rather than individual. 

 This point has been worked out only in recent literature, but its 

 advocates may find the source of this type of view in the French 

 thinkers now under discussion. 



Besides these two great movements, credited respectively to 

 Great Britain and France, modern naturalistic psychology has 

 had two important impulses. The first of these came about the 

 middle of the century in the rise of the evolution theory, and from 

 the side of biological science; the other from German beginnings, 

 and from the side of physical science. I shall speak of these re- 

 spectively as genetic psychology, finding its pioneers, Lamarck and 

 Darwin, in France and England, and experimental psychology, 

 founded by the Germans, Fechner and Lotze. 



The various factors now distinguished may be taken up briefly 

 in turn for consideration. I shall treat them under the two larger 

 headings already set forth: Naturalism, comprising (1) the Brit- 

 ish movement called above the Locke-Hume factor (empirical 

 psychology), and (2) the French-British evolution movement 

 (genetic psychology); and Positivism, comprising (1) the Rous- 

 seau-Comte movement (social psychology), and (2) the German 

 experimental movement (experimental psychology). 1 



1 These two headings are indeed not exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. 

 The viewpoint respecting the material cannot fail to influence the method; nor 

 the method the selection of material. For example, the Rousseau-Comte current 

 is a direct gain to naturalism no less than to positivism; and the opposite is true 

 of the Locke-Hume movement. 



The scientific treatment of mental diseases is also a most important matter, 

 which should be classed under positivism or positive method. It is not within 

 my province nor is the time ripe, I think to estimate it. Its development 

 is one of the great tasks of the twentieth century (cf. Meyer, Psychological Bul- 

 letin, May-June, 1904, for an exposition of present-day tendencies and theories). 



As it happens, it fell to the present writer to draw up a report on psychology 



