THE RELATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 629 



movements take place and currents go on, so we are led to acknow- 

 ledge that our simplest sensations are synthetic phenomena, con- 

 crete totalities, corresponding to more or less complex physio- 

 logical process. 



On the other hand, there is a dogmatism, which looks at mental 

 life as an indivisible unity, perhaps a substantial unity, which 

 defies all analysis. It forgets that mental life, as indeed all life, 

 exists under a perpetual struggle against internal and external 

 oppositions, and that even practical introspection discovers im- 

 portant points of difference, for instance, at every choosing be- 

 tween possibilities. Different dispositions and tendencies mani- 

 fest themselves in consciousness. The points of difference, then, 

 are not called forth by scientific observation and analysis, but 

 they belong to life itself. As scientific analysis by its one-sided- 

 ness always forces us to return to the great synthesis of life, so, on 

 the other hand, we are forced by the internal tension of life to 

 acknowledge the reality of differences and oppositions and so far 

 to verify the results of scientific analysis. Only what life has con- 

 nected, can be analyzed by us ; but this connection does not ex- 

 clude differences between the elements of life. 



In American literature the relation between analysis and syn- 

 thesis in psychology has been energetically ' investigated by such 

 eminent thinkers as William James and Hugo Miinsterberg. I believe 

 that the last-mentioned thinker has been led to assert a stronger 

 contrast between psychology and life than it is possible to maintain. 

 It is always life which gives to psychology its materials, and intro- 

 spection does not begin in scientific analysis, but is a practical 

 necessity which presupposes the existence of points of real difference 

 within the totality of life. 



The contrast between analysis and synthesis in the domain of 

 psychology has to a certain point an affinity with the contrast 

 between intellectualism and voluntarism. In the domain of sensa- 

 tions and ideas the distinction between elements can be made with 

 the least difficulty. It is the most articulated side of mental life, 

 and at the same time the side which is most open to observation 

 and experiment. The life of emotion and will shows a greater con- 

 centration, and the synthetical character here shows itself more 

 clearly. The over-valuing of the results of the analytical method 

 very naturally leads to undervalue the importance of emotional 

 and volitional life, and even, perhaps, to look at emotions and will 

 as mere resultants of sensations and ideas. But it is impossible to 

 deduce the mental concentration from the interaction of absolute 

 elements, and the whole direction of the development of sensations 

 and ideas is determined by the interests, values, and aims, which 

 have their foundation and find their expression in emotional and 



