THE RELATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 633 



the third order, the whole problem would stand in a clearer light to 

 us. But we should always here meet at last the great problem of the 

 relation of mind and matter. Here, also, the contrast between 

 analysis and synthesis becomes important. The difference which 

 can be established between mind and matter is due to analysis, to 

 a distinction of elements, which in reality exist in connection with 

 one another. We break the real totality, and afterwards we are 

 astonished, because it is difficult to unite the parts into which we 

 have divided it. This point has been very well cleared up by Wil- 

 helm Wundt and Roberto Ardigo. The reality is always the great 

 fundamental synthesis, within which we move with all our abstrac- 

 tions and analyses. It is a full unbroken melody, compared with our 

 laborious spelling. But there is no other way to knowledge than the 

 one which begins with analyzing. Our attention proceeds from 

 point to point, and only later on it tries to unite its single results. 

 And as little as we ought to ascribe absolute validity to our distinc- 

 tions, as little ought we to regard it as fortuitous that our seeking 

 after knowledge necessitates just these' special distinctions. It is one 

 of the characteristics of reality that it can only be comprehended 

 by careful analysis of its contents. 



I am not here going to discuss the hypotheses of the relation of 

 mind and brain. I shall only say that as the physiology of the pro- 

 cesses of the brain do not depend on other methods or points of view 

 than those of physical science in general, the duty of proving is 

 incumbent upon him who maintains an encroachment of the mind 

 on the physiological processes. Such a supposition would do away 

 with the independence of physiology. But there is no reason to 

 deviate from the principle which physical science has followed for 

 centuries, and to which all its triumphs are due, namely, that ma- 

 terial phenomena are to be explained by material causes. Even 

 to-day the dictum of Spinoza is valid: "When men say that this 

 or that action of the body springs from the mind, they do not 

 know what they say, and they do nothing but confess that they 

 know nothing about the cause of the action." The only working 

 hypothesis which makes possible a cooperation between physiology 

 and psychology without any encroachment from either side, regards 

 the relation of mind and matter as a functional relation, in the 

 mathematical sense of the word, and tries to find as much con- 

 tinuity within both series of phenomena as possible. A concluding 

 metaphysical interpretation is still an open question, but psych- 

 ology as such has nothing to do with it. The parallelism, or, as 

 I prefer to call it, the hypothesis of identity, has mostly been assailed 

 as a metaphysical hypothesis. But it is first of all a working hypo- 

 thesis, and the only one which can be followed up in all its conse- 

 quences in the present state of science. And as I have said of our 



