THE PRESENT PROBLEMS OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 



BY JAMES WARD 



[James Ward, Professor of Mental Philosophy, University of Cambridge, b. Hull, 

 England. M.A. London; Sc.D. Cambridge; Hon. LL.D. Edinburgh. Post- 

 graduate, Berlin, Leipzig, Gottingen; Fellow, Trinity College, Cambridge; 

 Gifford Lecturer, Aberdeen, 1895-97; Fellow of the British Academy. Author 

 of Naturalism and Agnosticism. Co-editor of The British Journal of Psychology.] 



"THE psychology of our day needs reforming from its very found- 

 ations," said Professor Lipps not very long ago; and, indeed, pro- 

 posals for its radical reconstruction are being offered us on every 

 side. Psychology must be thoroughly atomistic and structural, 

 says one: it should be altogether functional, says another. For 

 some it is the central philosophical discipline; for others it is but 

 a department of biology. According to one view, it is merely a 

 descriptive science; according to another, it is explanatory as 

 well. Plainly, then, one of the present problems of psychology is 

 the definition of psychology itself. Yet even this has been denied. 

 "It is preposterous at present to define psychology," says a recent 

 critic of such an attempt on my part, "preposterous to define psych- 

 ology, save as Bleck long ago defined philology: es ist was es 

 wird. It is in a process of rapid development. It has so many lines 

 and departments that if it could be correctly described to-day, all 

 the definitions might be outgrown to-morrow." There may be a 

 grain of truth in this somewhat extravagant contention. Ehe es 

 einen giUen Wein giebt, muss der Most sich erst toll gebarden, it has 

 been said. But surely, if we could define what is common ground 

 for u all to-day, we might leave to-morrow to take care of itself. 

 This common ground we call "General Psychology," and the as- 

 sumption upon which, I take it, we are here proceeding is that the 

 concepts of this general psychology are presupposed in the many 

 special departments which we speak of as experimental (or physi- 

 ological), comparative, pathological, etc.; and further, that these 

 concepts will be presupposed in whatever new developments of the 

 science the future may have in store. 



To ascertain, describe, and analyze the invariable factors of 

 psychical life, consciousness, or immediate experience is, it will, 

 I presume, be agreed, the main concern of general psychology. 

 "I find myself in a certain situation, which affects me pleasantly 

 or painfully, so that in the one case I strive to prolong the situa- 

 tion, and in the other to escape from it." So in ordinary language 

 we might any of us describe a moment of our own experience. 

 How much of this is essential? If we are to leave any place for 



