RELATIONS OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 665 



cesses under discussion. Indeed it is not too much to say that, un- 

 like the work of the anatomist, it is just this systematic knowledge 

 which we possess, knowledge of the functional complexes of the 

 conscious life, which gives form and rationality to the large but 

 undigested mass of facts which physiological investigation has 

 made known to us, a fact which the psychologist as well as the 

 physiologist is perhaps prone to forget. 



We turn next to those departments of thought and life to which 

 experimental psychology makes a direct and positive contribution; 

 and first of ethics, esthetics and religion. The common use of the 

 term "normative" in connection with this general group of sciences 

 has been made the ground for urging a distinction in point of view 

 between their fields of study and the descriptive sciences. The 

 latter, it is said, treat their subject-matter as sheer phenomena and 

 profess to note only the types and sequences which it presents. To 

 consider or desire an alternative event is beyond their scope. The 

 natural scientist deals historically with an irrevocable, because 

 given, system of facts. 



In the normative sciences, on the other hand, it is said, the fact 

 is considered not in relation to an actual type, which is itself but 

 a certain mean of the series of existing individuals, but in relation 

 to an ideal type, or norm, toward which the fact is conceived as 

 tending. It is the function of the normative sciences to determine 

 these standards and to pass judgment upon each of the facts as it 

 appears, appraising its worth in terms of its approach to these 

 ideals and apportioning praise and blame accordingly. It may seem 

 a gratuitous quibbling where such a real and practically important 

 distinction exists as that here in question. Yet I cannot but think 

 it necessary to protest against the terms in which this difference 

 is stated, or, if the terms be not misused, to deny the validity of the 

 distinction which is intended. 



All science is descriptive science, with a common nomenclature 

 as well as a single task. Its work is to determine the relations, both 

 qualitative and causal, which exist among phenomena. It always 

 describes what is, and seeks an explanation in terms of its historical 

 antecedents. No science, it has already been said, can be logically 

 subdivided into theoretical and experimental on the ground of 

 differences in procedure. Neither can the existing group of sciences 

 be subdivided in virtue of variations in the methods employed. 



The real distinction between the normative and descriptive 

 mental sciences lies in their subject-matter, and not in the manner 

 in which it is treated. Both alike deal with a system of phenomena, 

 and both seek to analyze the given facts for the purpose of deter- 

 mining their character and- order. The student of ethics, instead of 

 treating the content of human consciousness at large, studies only 



