THE RELATIONS OF COMPARATIVE AND GENETIC 

 PSYCHOLOGY TO OTHER BRANCHES OF SCIENCE 



BY CONWY LLOYD MORGAN 



[Conwy Lloyd Morgan, Principal of University College, Bristol, England, since 

 1887. b. London, February 6, 1852. Educated at Royal College of Science (Duke 

 of Cornwall scholar, Murchison Medalist, De la Beche Medalist and Associate 

 in Mining). Lecturer in English and Physical Science, Diocesan College, near 

 Capetown, 1878-84; Professor of Geology, University College, Bristol, 1884- 

 1901; Professor of Psychology, ibid. 1901. F.R.S. L.L.D (Aberdeen). Author 

 of Animal Biology; Animal Life and Intelligence; Introduction to Comparative 

 Psychology; Psychology for Teachers; Habit and Instinct; Animal Behaviour.] 



THE central purpose of this Congress is the unification of know- 

 ledge, and the discussion of those general principles and funda- 

 mental conceptions which underlie the related problems of allied 

 sciences. Now comparative and genetic psychology takes its place 

 between biology, on the one hand, with its doctrine of variation 

 and elimination, with its organic values in terms of survival, and, 

 on the other hand, such normative sciences as ethics and esthetics, 

 with their doctrines of worth for the ideal life of man. In any case 

 the starting-point is in close touch with purely biological reactions, 

 and the goal is our systems of knowledge and our ethical concep- 

 tions. And the fundamental principle underlying and giving unity 

 to these departments of study, in their genetic and strictly scientific 

 aspect, is evolution. 



It may be well at the outset to state that the province of com- 

 parative and genetic psychology, as I conceive it, is to investigate 

 the nature and mode of development of mental processes, deal- 

 ing with them in their synthetic rather than their analytic aspect, 

 at any rate employing the methods of comparison and analysis 

 with a predominantly synthetic aim and in such wise as to enable 

 us to reach general principles which may be applied to the eluci- 

 dation of particular cases. Incidentally it may have occasion to 

 classify mental products, to distinguish and group certain modes 

 of instinctive behavior, to mark off from each other sundry types 

 of association, and so forth; but it only does so in strict subserv- 

 ience to its central aim and object. That aim is explanatory rather 

 than descriptive. Every piece of comparative and genetic work 

 should be so planned as to contribute something to the establish- 

 ment or the support of the principles of psychology. It should add 

 fresh ideas to the ideal construction of the science. Only on these 

 terms can we claim, and shall we receive, the cordial recognition of 

 those who are working in other fields of psychological research - 

 on these terms, and, as a matter of course, on those of constant and 



