CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF SOCIOLOGY 789 



however, four specific forms in attempting to answer the ques- 

 tion: What definite mode of mental action is the most element- 

 ary form of the social relation? 



According to the most pretentious of these answers, one that 

 dates back to Epicurus and lies at the basis of all the covenant 

 or social-contract theories of political philosophy, the psycho- 

 logical origin of society is found in a perception of the utility of 

 association. It assumes that men consciously and purposely create 

 social relations to escape the ills of a "state of nature" and to reap 

 the rewards of cooperation. This rationalistic theory offers a true 

 explanation of highly artificial forms of social organization in a 

 civil, especially an industrial, state, but it throws no light upon the 

 nature of elemental, spontaneous cooperation. For this we must 

 turn to the other three conceptions all of them, I venture to think, 

 modernized forms of certain very ancient notions. 



According to one of these, the most elementary social fact is 

 seen in the constraining power, the impression, the contagious 

 influence that an aggregation, a mass, of living beings exerts upon 

 each individual mind. Society is thus viewed as a phenomenon 

 closely allied to suggestion and hypnosis. This view of society is 

 most fully set forth in the writings of Durkheim and Le Bon. 



A third conception, identified with the life-work of our lamented 

 colleague, Gabriel Tarde, assumes that impression, contagion, 

 influence, as forms of the interaction of mind with mind, may them- 

 selves be accounted for. It explains them as modes of example 

 and imitation. All society is thus resolved into products of imita- 

 tion. 



In strict psychological analysis these "impression" and "imi- 

 tation" theories must be classed, I think, as scientifically developed 

 forms of the "sympathy" theories of society, that may be traced 

 back through the literature of political philosophy to very early 

 days. They offer proximate explanations of the great social facts 

 of resemblance, of mutuality, of solidarity; but do they, beyond a 

 doubt, trace concerted activity back to its absolute origin? Above 

 all, do they account not only for similarity, but also for variation, 

 for the differentiation of communities into leaders and followers, 

 for competition as well as for combination, for liberty as well as for 

 solidarity? 



The fourth conception, put forth some years ago by the present 

 writer, should be classed as a developed form of the instinct theory, 

 dating back to Aristotle's aphorism that man is a political animal. 

 It assumes that the most elementary form of social relationship 

 is discovered in the very beginning of mental phenomena. In its 

 simplest form mental activity is a response of sensitive matter to 

 a stimulus. Any given stimulus may happen to be felt by more 



