790 SOCIOLOGY 



than one organism, at the same or at different times. Two or 

 more organisms may respond to the same given stimulus simul- 

 taneously or at different times. They may respond to the same 

 given stimulus in like or in unlike ways; in the same or in different 

 degrees; with like or with unlike promptitude; with equal or with 

 unequal persistence. I have attempted to show that in like re- 

 sponse to the same given stimulus we have the beginning, the 

 absolute origin, of all concerted activity the inception of every 

 conceivable form of cooperation; while in unlike response, and in 

 unequal response, we have the beginning of all those processes of 

 individuation, of differentiation, of competition, which, in their end- 

 lessly varied relations to combination, to cooperation, bring about 

 the infinite complexity of organized social life. 



It is unnecessary to argue that this conception of society not 

 only takes account of individuality as well as of mutuality, but 

 that also it carries our interpretation of solidarity farther back 

 than the theories of impression and of imitation, since both im- 

 pression and imitation must be accounted for in ultimate psych- 

 ological analysis as phenomena of reciprocal, or interstimulation 

 and response. Indeed, the very language that Tarde uses through- 

 out his exposition tacitly assumes as much. Example is stimulus, 

 the imitative act is response to stimulus. The impression that the 

 crowd makes upon an individual is stimulus, and the submission, 

 obedience, or conformity of the individual is response to stimulus. 

 Moreover, the formation of the crowd itself has to be accounted 

 for, and it will be found that, in many cases, the formation of a 

 crowd is nothing more nor less than the simultaneous like-response 

 of many individuals to some inciting event, circumstance, or sug- 

 gestion. In short, impression, imitation, and conformity are spe- 

 cific modes, but not by any means the primary or simplest modes 

 of stimulation and response; and some of the most important 

 phenomena of concerted action can be explained only as springing 

 directly from primary like-responses, before either imitation or 

 impression has entered into the process. 



This conception meets one further scientific test. It offers a 

 simple and consistent view of the relation between social life and 

 the material universe. It assumes that the original causes of soci- 

 ety lie in the material environment, which may be regarded as an 

 infinitely differentiated group of stimuli of like-response, and there- 

 fore of collective action; while the products of past social life, con- 

 stituting the historical tradition, become in their turn secondary 

 stimuli, or secondary causes, in the social process. 



A mere momentary like-response by any number of individuals 

 is the beginning of social phenomena, but it does not constitute 

 a society. Before society can exist there must be continuous ex- 



