CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF SOCIOLOGY 791 



posure to like influences, and repeated reaction upon them. When 

 this happens, the individuals thus persistently acting in like ways 

 become themselves mentally and practically alike. But likeness 

 is not identity. The degrees of resemblance or of difference in the 

 manner of response to common stimuli manifest themselves as 

 distinguishable types of mind and of character in the , aggregate 

 of individuals; while the differing degrees of promptitude and 

 persistency in response have as their consequence a differentia- 

 tion of the aggregate into leaders and followers, those that assume 

 initiative and responsibility, and those that habitually look for 

 guidance. These differences and resemblances have subjective con- 

 sequences. Differing individuals become aware of their differences, 

 resembling individuals become aware of their resemblances, and the 

 consciousness of kind so engendered becomes thenceforth a potent 

 factor in further social evolution. 



Summarizing our analysis to this point, we may say that we 

 conceive of society as any plural number of sentient creatures 

 more or less continuously subjected to common stimuli, to differing 

 stimuli, and to interstimulation, and responding thereto in like 

 behavior, concerted activity, or cooperation, as well as in unlike, 

 or competitive, activity; and becoming therefore, with developing 

 intelligence, coherent through a dominating consciousness of kind, 

 while always sufficiently conscious of difference to insure a measure 

 of individual liberty. 



Which of these various conceptions of the ultimate nature of 

 the social relation shall in the long run prevail must depend upon 

 a certain fitness to account for all the phenomena of social life in 

 the simplest terms. That fitness can be determined only through 

 the further evolution of social theory. 



But whatever the finally accepted view may be, there are cer- 

 tain classifications of social facts that may be accepted as among 

 the elementary notions of any sociological system. 



And first there are types or kinds of societies. The broadest 

 groupings correspond to the familiar demarkations made by Nat- 

 ural History. There are animal societies and human societies; and 

 the human societies are further divided into the ethnic, or com- 

 munities of kindred, and the civil, or communities composed of 

 individuals that dwell and work together without regard to their 

 blood-relationships. 



More significant for the sociologist, however, is a classification 

 based on psychological characteristics. The fundamental division 

 now is into instinctive and rational societies. The bauds, swarms, 

 flocks, and herds in which animals live and cooperate, are held 

 together by instinct and not by rational comprehension of the 



