ECONOMIC SCIENCE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 27 



sociology in which of necessity the is and the ought-to-be are merged 

 in one. They have no need of going outside the system to point 

 applications of its principle. Under the ordre naturel whatever is 

 of right ought also to be. The laws of the physiocratic economy are 

 not statements of mere historical uniformities or sequences. The 

 sequences are regarded of necessity as describing consummations to 

 be desired, for they are, in a discreet sense, natural sequences. So, 

 while thinking in the spirit of a utilitarian science, the Physiocrat is 

 able to speak in the language of positive science. But, for all that, 

 a positive science of economics, as concerned merely with the explana- 

 tion of things, had not yet emerged. And what is true of the Physio- 

 crats in this regard is true of much of the later science so far as it 

 worked under the guidance of the metaphysics of natural propensity 

 or any of its derivatives. 



The next important advance in economics is connected with the 

 activity of Adam Smith; and it is to be rated the most considerable 

 advance ever accomplished for the science by any single individual. 

 And his work is to be rated as a great achievement whether we regard 

 the body of its specific teachings or whether we regard only its larger 

 features as set forth in the general attitude of the author. The pains- 

 taking scholarship that has been brought to bear in recent years on 

 the history of economic science has shown Adam Smith's indebted- 

 ness to his contemporaries to be greater than was once supposed. 

 Very real affinities of thought and attitude are now traced where 

 formerly the differences seemed prominent. 



Particularly close is Smith's kinship with the Physiocrats; so close 

 that with the lapse of time there seems to be increasing disposition to 

 group him with them, rather than to set either them or him apart 

 from the direct line in tracing the pedigree of the science. Adam 

 Smith stands on much the same plane of culture as the Physiocrats. 

 With both, the fundamental constitution of the science is meta- 

 physical, and with him, as with them, the metaphysics is the meta- 

 physics of natural propensity; with this difference, that in Adam 

 Smith the metaphysics is toned down somewhat and is made to play 

 a less overt part in shaping the formulations of theory, which is, 

 perhaps, only another way of saying, with just about the difference 

 that we would expect between a representative French thinker of the 

 eighteenth century and a representative Scotchman. Indeed, in this 

 respect, Adam Smith may be said to occupy a transitional position in 

 the history of economic thought, if the greater prevalence of the 

 matter-of-fact habit of mind may be taken legitimately, as broadly 

 describing the cultural advance of the ninteeenth century. The 

 sources that fed this advance in Adam Smith need not detain us. It 

 is probably to be set down to the credit of no single influence or indi- 



