62 ECONOMIC THEORY 



after deliberate inquiry, explained the smaller practical influence of 

 the economist in government and administration as due, first, to 

 the transition of political economy from an art to a science with 

 a corresponding loss of clearness and precision in its propositions; 

 second, to the use of precedent rather than scientific analysis by the 

 courts as the basis of the adjudication of modern economic problems; 

 third, to the neglect of collective interests and to the checks upon 

 administrative power in the organization of modern representative 

 government. 



But whatever truth resides in these analyses and there is 

 much fundamentally and in the last instance, the distinctly, nay, 

 the distinctively unfavorable attitude of the public mind towards 

 economic theory can only be due to one or more of four causes: 



First, the public mind may be inherently opposed to accept 

 scientific leadership in the formation of its economic opinions in 

 something of the same sense that the late Mr. Spencer noted that 

 men who would instantly disclaim judgment in problems of the 

 natural sciences, would, without correspondingly greater equip- 

 ment, give out-of-hand verdict upon complex questions of social 

 policy. Or, second, it may be that economic phenomena in their 

 complexity, variety, and inaccessibility defy, beyond a certain 

 point, that productive systematic inquiry which we term successful 

 scientific study. Or, third, the tribe of economists may be intellectu- 

 ally inferior to their fellow scientists, or at least less well equipped in 

 those particular mental requisites which go to make up the successful 

 scientist. Or, finally, the methods and the apparatus employed by 

 the political economist may be relatively inefficient. 



If political economy as a subject of scientific study has any right 

 to be, we must of necessity reject the first three of these hypotheses 

 and concentrate our attention upon the fourth. Such a procedure 

 is, moreover, encouraged by the complexion of existing facts. It 

 requires the barest observation to realize a startling contrast in 

 method between political economy and any of the actively pursued 

 natural sciences. Let us turn for a moment to chemistry, where 

 within recent years the bounds of organized knowledge have been 

 extended with the most brilliant results. In so far as the layman 

 may speak, it appears that modern chemical or for that matter, 

 physical or biological study involves three consecutive stages: 

 (1) Inquiry and research; (2) experiment; (3) theorization. Asso- 

 ciated with these essential activities are the complementary processes 

 of initial conjecture affording a tentative working-plan; formation of 

 trial hypotheses in result of investigation and for submission to 

 experiment; and conversion, by demonstration, of theory into law. 

 But, in the main, chemical science advances from truth to truth, 

 from probability to certainty, because a body of mature workers, 



