376 DIPLOMACY 



It is precisely this conception of " sovereignty " that reveals the 

 transformation of human thought with regard to the organization and 

 relations of the state. In the Roman Republic, it signified simply 

 " the majesty " of the Roman people, but under the Empire it lost 

 its connection with the constituent elements of the state, and was 

 translated into " the will of the Emperor." j In the revival of Roman 

 law that accompanied the formation of modern states, it assumed 

 the form of absolute monarchy, and accepted the formula, " What- 

 ever is pleasing to the Prince has the force of law." In the philosophy 

 of the revolutionary era, the source of authority was sought in the 

 people, but without losing its absolute character. The doctrine of 

 " popular sovereignty," in its crude and unanalyzed form, suggests 

 that whatever is pleasing to the majority has the force of law, 

 an inference which might be used to justify any enormity which 

 a vicious or misguided multitude might choose to perpetrate upon 

 the few, or upon the rights of foreign peoples. 



Such a conception of the state would be as false as it is inade- 

 quate, and no thoughtful and well instructed jurist would defend 

 it. The essence and justification of the state lie in the social pur- 

 pose which it seeks to accomplish, as defined in its constitution, for 

 the bare and formless will of a people cannot serve as its foundation. 

 A state is not a chance or arbitrary association of men bent on 

 a predatory expedition. Such a group of human beings would be 

 called a mob rather than a commonwealth. Nor can such an aggre- 

 gation of men rise to the dignity of a state by mere organization 

 and discipline, as a band of highwaymen might be subordinated to 

 the direction of a chief. A state is brought into being by historic 

 conditions which unite men in a body politic for the purpose of self- 

 regulation and the realization of common ends of order, justice, and 

 security. The state, therefore, is a moral entity, in which all private 

 benefits are subordinated to public well-being. 



It is only as a moral entity, or, as it has even been called, as 

 a " moral person," possessed of will, intelligence, and determin- 

 ing principles, that a form of human society can claim the attributes 

 of a state. Otherwise, it is merely a form of force, without pre- 

 rogatives founded on juridical conceptions. What, then, is " sover- 

 eignty," if not the prerogative of a state to command its own 

 constituents, to make and enforce laws, to guard its own being 

 and independence from aggression, and to be recognized as a moral 

 entity? 



Such is the modern juristic conception of the state, and as such 

 it holds its place in the family of nations. Is it, then, a moral entity 

 when seen from within, and devoid of all relation to law and justice 

 when regarded from without? The qualities which support and 

 justify its claim to " sovereignty " within establish its place as a 



