we have further seen that the delegations have no legislative power, 

 and are, even in the sphere of their competence, nothing like Reichs- 

 vertretungen, " imperial representative assemblies/' as the said 

 authors sometimes like to call them, but simply select committees 

 of both parliaments, called into existence for purposes of easier 

 communication between them, and working under their constant 

 control. 



It has no judiciary; questions arising between the two countries 

 must be settled, if agreement is impossible, by international arbi- 

 tration, as was done in a boundary question two years ago. 



But it seems to have, and there our opponents exult, at least 

 an executive. What are the common ministers if not some embodi- 

 ment of a common, of an imperial, executive power? I own to 

 standing aghast at such a profundity of knowledge. Common minis- 

 ters, then, should represent a common, an imperial, executive power; 

 now, let us overlook the queer aspect of an empire-like settlement, 

 possessed of no other attribution, no other public power but of an 

 executive; let us overlook the little hand-trick which must be per- 

 formed imperceptibly to glide from " common," which supposes 

 two parties at least, into " imperial," which means one; and let 

 us simply state that even a common executive power does not exist, 

 cannot exist, between Hungary and Austria. There are common 

 ministers indeed, but in what constitution of the world is executive 

 power vested in ministries? We find it everywhere among the con- 

 stitutional attributes of the first magistrate, subject to more or less 

 restrictions, but vested in him, having its real existence personified 

 by him, ministers being merely his agents, though they may be 

 necessary agents, agents designated by the constitution. In Hun- 

 gary, executive power is vested in the King; in Austria, in the 

 Emperor; now, as we have seen, the King of Hungary and the 

 Emperor of Austria, though meeting in one physical person, are two 

 distinct personalities in public law, every part of their prerogative 

 being distinct and generally different. The King of Hungary can 

 only be invested with the executive power of Hungary, the Emperor 

 of Austria with the executive power of Austria; no third personality 

 of public law, no sort of imperial first magistrateship has ever been 

 conferred on his Majesty, nor does such a personality, I presume, 

 evolve out of nothing by a sort of generatio equivoca, spontaneous 

 growth. So there exists no person in whom such common, or 

 imperial, executive power could possibly be vested, just as there 

 is no source from which it could be derived, even to float in the air. 

 What are, then, our common ministers? They are simply common 

 agents, agents of both executive powers, Hungarian and Austrian; 

 for those branches of government in which both executives should 

 act together, they are ministers of the Emperor and of the King, to 



