PROBLEMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 583 



a project of law, the constitution orders that they shall, at last, unite 

 in the one original assembly from which they proceeded and deter- 

 mine the matter there. This means, of course, that after a certain 

 time the Senate must practically always succumb to the will of the 

 other chamber. These are serious defects, so serious as almost to 

 take Norway out of the category of states that have made most 

 progress in the solution of the problem. 



The members of the Netherlands Senate are chosen in the same 

 manner and by the same kind of bodies as those of the Swedish 

 chamber, but in the distribution of the seats some consideration is 

 paid to the provincial lines, the distribution not being in exact accord 

 with the principle of population, though not far away from it. 



Finally, in the Belgian system, there is a complexity both in the 

 method of choosing the senators and in the distribution of the seats, 

 which amounts to a defect, in each respect. Most of the senators 

 are chosen directly by the voters, and in the election of these, two 

 deputy-parliamentary districts constitute one senatorial district. 

 This is simple and democratic, although somewhat radical. The 

 others are chosen by the provincial assemblies, and in the distribu- 

 tion of these among the several provinces much consideration is 

 had to the provincial lines, the less populous provinces being favored. 

 The purpose of this device is to offset the radicalness of the other 

 part. This is certainly a makeshift. It would have been far more 

 in accord with sound theory to have provided for the choice of all 

 the senators by the provincial assemblies, while distributing the 

 seats among the provinces according to population. There is 

 nothing necessarily undemocratic in the practice of indirect election, 

 but it is quite undemocratic to distribute the seats in any legislative 

 body except in accordance with the principle of population, or at 

 least something approaching that. 



When now we turn to the construction of the Senate in the other 

 thirteen constitutions, we find ourselves in the midst of a chaos in 

 the practice with no consistent principle to guide us. Seats by 

 virtue of hereditary right, as, most largely in the British, Austrian, 

 and Hungarian constitutions, and partly in the Spanish, which is 

 certainly medieval both in origin and spirit; seats by virtue of office, 

 as in the same constitutions, which besides being, for the most part, 

 also, medieval, conflict with the modern principle of the incom- 

 patibility of office with legislative mandate; seats by royal appoint- 

 ment, as partly in the four systems just mentioned, with that of 

 Denmark; as almost the exclusive principle in the construction of the 

 German Bundesrath, and as the exclusive principle in the construction 

 of the Italian and Portuguese Senates, excepting the seats of the 

 princes of the royal house, as a rule, the weakest sort of a Senate, 

 being generally a sort of royal appendage, affording the crown no 



