Whately's Definition. 41 



has any power of gaining knowledge by experience 

 or from instruction, or whether it has any compre- 

 hension of the work which it performs. In fact the 

 definition, instead of settling any thing, is simply 

 a dogmatic assertion from which questions branch 

 off in all directions. And many of our best natu* 

 ralists would begin by denying the assertion alto- 

 gether. 



Whately says, Instinct is a tendency to some 

 mode of action^ and since he says it is a blind ten- 

 dency — we suppose he argues that the tendency 

 comes without experience or instruction. But he 

 adds this important element to Paley's definition, 

 that this tendency is independent of any consideration 

 on the part of the agent of the end to which the action 

 leads. Here then we have another very sweeping 

 assertion, for it puts every instinctive act on a level 

 with the movement of water under the influence of 

 gravitation, or the movement of particles in the 

 process of crystallization. This assertion is not 

 made of certain instinctive acts but of all. Accord- 

 ing to this, whenever we decide that any act is in- 

 stinctive, we must also decide that the animal per- 

 forming it has no consideration of the end to which 

 the action leads, however complex the action or 

 wonderful the end secured. 



This definition standing by itself without expla- 

 nations would give rise to as much controversy as 

 that of Paley ; for after two men had agreed to ac- 

 cept it they still might be very far from agreeing 

 whether a specific act was instinctive or not. After 

 agreeing upon the definition, perhaps the first ob- 



