Thinki?ig. 189 



the result of choice, as related to some end compre- 

 hended by them as desirable ? In other words, do 

 animals comprehend relations, and then act for the 

 purpose of securing pleasure, by adapting means to 

 ends ; or are they impelled to all acts, for their pres- 

 ervation and productive of pleasure to them, by a 

 blindly working force, that gives law to their vol- 

 untary acts, with no aid from any of those powers, 

 that are the chief distinction of man ? Are animals, 

 in any proper sense, thinking beings ? The answer 

 to this question can be given, not by considering 

 the nature of any act alone, but the conditions, un- 

 der which the act is performed. For purely in- 

 stinctive acts manifest as much wisdom, as any in- 

 telligent act possibly can, in aiming at the same re- 

 sult. We must also agree as to what is meant by 

 thinking; or else, while we agree as to the mental 

 status of animals, we may continue our war of 

 words, simply in defence of our definitions. 



We have had of late, the question proposed ; 

 What is it to think? And we have had answers 

 given, that all thought involves processes beyond 

 the powers of animals, and therefore that they do 

 not think. This is a short way of disposing of the 

 matter ; and most questions can be disposed of in 

 the same manner. If a man starts with a given 

 definition of thinking, declaring that it always in- 

 volves certain elements, and then denies that ani- 

 mals ever have those elements, because he accounts 

 for all apparent manifestation of these elements 

 in them, by some low form of association of ideas, 

 the argument, with him, is ended, of course. We 



