190 Instinct. 



believe that animals have elements of thought 

 which some have denied to them. We know, cer 

 tainly, that animals act as though they had notions 

 of time, space and causality. But it can never be 

 conclusively proved that they have them, we readi- 

 ly admit. 



To be explicit, let us define " thinking," as we 

 now intend to use the word. If any object to the 

 definition, they will understand our meaning. 

 When any being performs an act, to secure pleas- 

 ure or avoid pain, because he comprehends his act 

 as a means to secure the end, we consider that think- 

 ing is involved, — of course, it often rises into high- 

 er planes than this, as philosophical thinking ; but 

 we consider that it begins, wherever beings act 

 from any comprehejision of means and ends. 



That animals perform acts, which seem to imply 

 thought, no one will deny ; purely instinctive acts, 

 and even the movements of plants, seem to imply 

 thought, where there is no sensation even. If we 

 detect Intellect in animals at all then, it will not be, 

 because they perform certain acts ; but it will be, 

 because they perform these acts under the same 

 conditions, and by the same means, or methods, as 

 men perform them. We must direct our attention 

 then, mainly to the conditions under which the 

 acts of the higher animals are performed. 



We are now called upon to enter one of the 

 most difficult of all fields of observation, and to com- 

 pare objects that elude the grasp of every sense. 

 Those who have attempted to compare their own 

 sensations and conceptions with those of others, 



