230 Instinct. 



fied by it, and to reach, if possible, that guiding 

 and controlling power for all the activities, of which 

 we have spoken. 



It is generally conceded by Psychologists, that 

 man, as a rational being, has certain intuitive no- 

 tions in regard to being, quantity, causality and 

 the like. It belongs to Mental and Moral Philos- 

 ophy to treat of these notions fully. But we are 

 here called upon to mark more clearly, than we 

 have done, the difference between hituition and an- 

 other principle in the higher nature of man, which 

 seems to be the same in its method of action as ac- 

 knowledged Instinct, hituitions belong to us as ra- 

 tional beings simply; Instmcts, as beings called 

 upon to act. We believe some things instinctively, 

 and some things intnitively. The words have been 

 often used interchangeably, though, in general, they 

 have been so used as to show that there ought to 

 be a difference between them. We will start with 

 a distinction, which we trust our past and future 

 discussions will, when taken together, show to be a 

 just one. 



Instinct belongs to beings, as acting, and so 

 relates to the nature and possible combination of 

 things, and the order of events. Our knowledge 

 of these, and of our right relations to them, even 

 in the highest realm, is secured partly by instinct- 

 ive action ; and necessarily so, because Instinct 

 gives all that is necessary for action, which we can- 

 not learn by observation and experience, — all that 

 is necessary as a basis for experience, as well as the 

 impulse to perform certain acts. 



