254 histinct. 



ing. Every act would be from his judgment of 

 expediency in promoting pleasure or avoiding suf- 

 fering. Everything would be reduced to the level 

 of that action, by which a man cuts his wood in 

 season to have it«dry in winter, or puts his kindling 

 in better shape and provides it in larger quantities, 

 as the clouds and winds betoken increased cold. 

 If he acted for children or friends, it would be from 

 a natural impulse alone, as animals act in caring 

 for their kind. With such beings the word ex- 

 pedient would be the highest in enforcing action ; 

 but, OUGHT, with the signification it now has, would 

 be unknown. 



Now, in man, we find another wonderful im- 

 pulse to action making a part of his higher nature, 

 and by which all the lower instincts and powers 

 maybe intensified in action, or be kept in abeyance. 

 This is Obligation^ or the Sense of Obligation. It is 

 not only ultimate, like the impulses of the lower 

 nature, but it is the highest impulse — ultimate in 

 our analysis of man, as a moral being. As it be- 

 longs to man to comprehend the action of all his 

 lower powers, and the use and proper limit of each 

 one of them, this higher impulse grapples on to 

 everyone of them to restrain or quicken them. If, 

 now, the knowledge of man were perfect, this Sense 

 of Obligation would be a sure guide, and every act 

 in accordance with its impulse would be the best 

 possible. If the will were strong enough to secure 

 every act that Obligation demands, man would 

 be a perfect being. Mistake in action would be im- 

 possible. Perfect comprehension of the best rela- 



