26o Instinct. 



but that its tendency is to secure right action, even 

 amidst the most disastrous mistakes of ignorance. 

 This we think will appear before we close the dis- 

 cussion. And we now proceed to consider this 

 sense of obligation still farther, in its subordinate 

 operations to secure conformity to what would be 

 its first great command, if man had wisdom enough 

 to discover his true end from the beginning. 



In the first place, the sense of obligation always 

 arises to do a specific act, when that act is judged by 

 us, to promote any end, the seeking of which obliga- 

 tion commands. It is no proof that the act will aid 

 in securing the end, because the sense of obligation 

 arises to perform it. If it were, man would need no 

 aid from knowledge to guide his conduct in seek- 

 ing any end that he knows to be good, — he would 

 guide himself perfectly by the sense of obligation 

 alone. All mistakes in seeking such an end would 

 be impossible ; and growth in knowledge would be 

 useless as an aid in guiding moral action. There 

 are those who make this fatal blunder in Hfe. They 

 satisfy " conscience^' and through ignorance of re- 

 lations commit hideous wrong, and call it God's ser- 

 vice. Men may feel under obligation to do most 

 wicked things, when they are ignorant, because the 

 sense of obligation was never given to take the 

 place of knowledge, or to be any excuse for igno- 

 rance. 



The sense of obligation, as securing specific acts, 

 has a certain fixed relation, then, to the comprehend- 

 ing power, or the judgments formed through the 

 agency of that power. Let the judgment decide 



