270 Instinct. 



ture in man is the natural ruler of the other in him, 

 there is often conflict between them. The lower 

 impulses draw in one direction, while Obligation 

 forbids the advance, or even demands an entirely 

 different line of action. If this were not so, man 

 would know nothing of those moral conflicts which 

 he now finds going on within him. An animal 

 may, by its nature, be impelled or compelled, to 

 fight another ; but as a moral being, a man's se- 

 verest battles are with himself, — between his high- 

 er and lower nature. 



When the lower impulses are in one direction, 

 and the impulse of Obligation in another, the con- 

 dition of CHOICE is presented. And rational choice 

 is involved, in every act which follows the Sense of 

 Obligation, when that arises from a comprehension 

 of results. As the first demand of Obligation is 

 that the highest end of man should be chosen, 

 when that end is comprehended, so the first ration- 

 al, generi'c choice is the choice of that end, as the 

 goal towards which every power must press. That 

 act of choice declares that the lower nature shall, 

 henceforth, be the servant of the higher, — it shall 

 be well used, that it may be a good servant, 

 but the doom of its servitude is pronounced, once 

 for all. The man henceforth rules himself, — all the 

 animal nature within him is in subjection. Such a 

 choice is the act of Free Personality. It cannot 

 be illustrated, because there is nothing else like it. 

 It is the only point of true freedom. It is known 

 by consciousness alone. Every act of choice, both 

 generic and specific, may be in the line that Obli- 



