2'J2 Instinct, 



tion, the punishment that follows is quick and in- 

 tense. If the act is as Obhgation demands, there is, 

 at the time, no recoil, although the act, through ig- 

 norance, may produce the worst results. There 

 may be sorrow for the unfortunate results, but no 

 remorse. But if the judgment, afterwards, decides 

 that the ignorance which caused the evil was un- 

 necessary, then remorse follows, as though the Sense 

 of Obligation had been violated at the time of per- 

 forming the act. For it is a part of the office of 

 Obligation, as we have shown, to secure from the 

 comprehending power all the light it can give. 



There must be an apprehension of one's rela- 

 tion to an act, before Obligation can arise. Then 

 there must be consciousness of the Obligation. 

 Conscience then, or moral consciousness^ grasps by 

 an intuitive comprehension every relation of man 

 to every act involving choice between the im- 

 pulses of the higher and lower nature ; and in con- 

 nection with every such act contrary to the sense 

 of Obligation, there comes the punishment of re- 

 morse, which we conceive to be the dreadful recoil 

 of this highest moral impulse. Obligation, when it 

 is defied and thwarted in its legitimate work. It is 

 Conscience or moral consciousness, that makes the 

 torments of remorse possible ; and if one chooses 

 to regard obligation and remorse both as the work 

 of Conscience, we do not object, as we are seeking 

 for facts, and not for theoretical divisions or defini- 

 tions. 



We are now prepared to state the difference be- 

 tween a man and an animal, as we have found them 



