2/4 histmct. 



stincts call the moral nature into action, it is true ; 

 but in the animals, they need neither guidance nor 

 restraint from obHgation or any thing above them, 

 as we have shown. 



But an animal may have, and probably does 

 have, other emotions which are so intimately related 

 to the moral nature, as instruments, as to be readi- 

 ly mistaken for its essential powers, or character- 

 istics. An animal may have the emotion of pity, 

 and also an impulse that secures justice, so far as it is 

 essential to animal Hfe. They, certainly, instinctive- 

 ly act as though they had such emotions. It may 

 be that they have only a simple impulse, that secures 

 the proper action, while in man, there may precede 

 every one of his acts, comprehension, the sense of 

 of Obligation, and choice. If we say that Obliga- 

 tion can only follow comprehension of ends, then 

 we must allow that the simple impulses, which se- 

 cure justice, truth and the like, are in the same 

 line as Obligation would require, were there compre- 

 hension of the results, and so like it in every re- 

 spect as to be distinguished from it with great 

 difficulty. 



If animals have a comprehension of moral rela- 

 tions, with the accompanying sense of Obligation, 

 and that consciousness of the comprehension of 

 relations and sense of obligation, which is Conscience 

 itself, or the product of Conscience, we see no 

 proof of it. We can account for all their actions, 

 perfectly, by referring to some lower principle of 

 instinctive impulse, which in them is self-directive. 



