4 Darwin, and after Darwin. 



legitimate one for a naturalist to follow ; and although 

 Cuvier himself was far from being always loyal to it, 

 he leaves no doubt regarding the estimate in which he 

 held the still greater deviations of his colleagues, St. 

 Hilaire and Lamarck. 



Now, these traditional notions touching the severance 

 between the facts of natural history and the philosophy 

 of it, continued more or less to dominate the minds of 

 naturalists until the publication of the Origin of 

 Species, in 1859. Then it was that an epoch was 

 marked in this respect, as in so many other respects 

 where natural history is concerned. For, looking to 

 the enormous results which followed from a deliberate 

 disregard of such traditional canons by Darwin, it has 

 long since become impossible for naturalists, even of 

 the strictest sect, not to perceive that their previous 

 bondage to the law of a mere ritual has been for ever 

 superseded by what verily deserves to be regarded as 

 a new dispensation. Yet it cannot be said, or even so 

 much as suspected, that Darwin's method in any way 

 resembled that of pre-scientific days, the revolt against 

 which led to the straight-laced — and for a long time 

 most salutary — conceptions of method that we have 

 just been noticing. Where, then, is the difference? 

 To me it seems that the difference is as follows ; and, 

 if so, that not the least of our many obligations to 

 Darwin as the great organizer of biological science 

 arises from his having clearly displayed the true 

 principle which ought to govern biological research. 



To begin with, he nowhere loses sight of the 

 primary distinction between fact and theory ; so that, 

 thus far, he loyally follows the spirit of revolt against 

 subjective methods. But, while always holding this 



