Criticisms of Theory of Natural Selection. 339 



as we saw in the last chapter. Now all the promis- 

 cuous variations which are supplied to the breeder, 

 and out of which, by selecting only those that are 

 suited to his purpose, he is able to produce the 

 required result — all those promiscuous variations, in 

 relation to that purpose, are accidental. Therefore 

 the sclecLive agency of the breeder deserves to be 

 regarded as the cause of that which it produces, or 

 of that which could not have been produced but for 

 the operation of such agency. But where is th' 

 difference between artificial and natural selection in 

 this respect ? And, if there is no difference, is not 

 natural selection as much entitled to be regarded as a 

 true cause of the origin of natural species^ as artificial 

 selection is to be regarded as a true cause of our 

 domesticated races ? Here, as in the case of the 

 previous ilkistration, if there be any ambiguity in 

 speaking of variations as accidental, it arises from 

 the incorrect or undefined manner in which the term 

 "accidental" is used by Darwin's critics. In its 

 original and philosophically-correct usage, the term 

 "accident" signifies a property or quality not essential 

 to our conception of a substance : hence, it has come 

 to mean anything that happens as a result of unfore- 

 seen causes — or, lastly, that which is causeless. But, 

 as we know that nothing can happen without causes 

 of some kind, the term •' accident" is divested of real 

 meaning when it is used in the last of these senses. 

 Yet this is the sense that is sought to be placed upon 

 it by the objection which we are considering. If the 

 objectors will but understand the term in its correct 

 philosophical sense — or in the only sense in which 

 it presents any meaning at all, — they will see that 



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