Advancement of Learning 93 



wherein I may without prejudice preserve thus much of the 

 conceit of antiquity, that Physique should contemplate 

 that which is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory ; 

 and Metaphysique that which is abstracted and fixed. 

 And again, that Physique should handle that which sup- 

 poseth in nature only a being and moving; and Meta 

 physique should handle that which supposeth further in 

 nature a reason, understanding, and platform. But the 

 difference, perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and 

 sensible. For as we divided natural philosophy in general 

 into the inquiry of causes, and productions of effects : so that 

 part which concerneth the inquiry of causes we do sub 

 divide according to the received and found division of 

 causes ; the one part, which is Physique, inquireth and 

 handleth the material and efficient causes ; and the other, 

 which is Metaphysique, handleth the formal and final 

 causes. 1 



Physique, taking it according to the derivation, and not 

 according to our idiom for medicine, is situate in a middle 

 term or distance between Natural History and Meta 

 physique. For natural history describeth the variety 

 of things ; physique, the causes, but variable or respective 

 causes; and metaphysique, the fixed and constant causes. 



Limus ut hit durescit, et haec ut cera liquescit, 

 Uno eodemque igni: 2 



Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay; 

 fire is the cause of colliquation, but respective to wax; but 

 fire is no constant cause either of induration or colliquation : 

 so then the physical causes are but the efficient and the 

 matter. Physique hath three parts; whereof two respect 

 nature united or collected, the third contemplateth nature 

 diffused or distributed. Nature is collected either into one 

 entire total, or else into the same principles or seeds. So as 

 the first doctrine is touching the contexture or configura 

 tion of things, as de mundo, de universitate rerum. The 

 second is the doctrine concerning the principles or originals 

 of times. The third is the doctrine concerning all variety 

 and particularity of things; whether it be of the differing 



1 For these &quot;four causes&quot; see Arist. Post. Anal. ii. 10, i. Cf. 

 Mill s Logic, bk. iii. ch. 5. 

 * Virg. Ed. viii. 80. 



