Advancement of Learning i 2 1 



but is invested with, or at leastwise usurpeth no small 

 authority in itself, besides the duty of the message. For 

 it was well said by Aristotle, That the mind hath over the 

 body that commandment, which the lord hath over a bondman ; 

 but that reason hath over the imagination that commandment 

 which a magistrate hath over a free citizen; x who may come 

 also to rule in his turn. For we see that, in matters of Faith 

 and Religion, we raise our Imagination above our Reason ; 

 which is the cause why Religion sought ever access to the 

 mind by similitude, types, parables, visions, dreams. And 

 again, in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and 

 other impressions of like nature, which do paint and disguise 

 the true appearance of things, the chief recommenda 

 tion unto Reason is from the Imagination. 2 Nevertheless, 

 because I find not any science that doth properly or fitly 

 pertain to the Imagination, I see no cause to alter the 

 former division. For as for poesy, it is rather a pleasure or 

 play of Imagination, than a work or duty thereof. And if 

 it be a work, we speak not now of such parts of learning as 

 the Imagination produceth, but of such sciences as handle 

 and consider of the Imagination; no more than we shall 

 speak now of such knowledges as reason produceth, for that 

 extendeth to all philosophy, but of such knowledges as do 

 handle and inquire the faculty of reason : so as poesy had 

 its true place. As for the power of the Imagination in 

 nature, and the manner of fortifying the same, we have 

 mentioned it in the doctrine De Anima, whereunto it most 

 fitly belongeth. And lastly, for Imaginative or Insinuative 

 Reason, which is the subject of Rhetoric, we think it best to 

 refer it to the Arts of Reason. So therefore we content 

 ourselves with the former division, that human philosophy, 

 which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man, hath 

 two parts, rational and moral. 



The part of human philosophy which is rational, is of all 

 knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful; and 

 seemeth but a net of subtilty and spinosity. For as it was 

 truly said, that knowledge is Pabulum animi, 3 so in the 



1 Aristot. Polit. i. 5, 6; where fy&amp;gt;eu, appetite, is the term here 

 rendered by imagination. 



2 I.e. Rhetoric aims at the feelings rather than at the cool judg 

 ment, and inflames Imagination till she overpowers Reason. 



8 Cic. Acad. iv. ad Lucullum, 32 a. (Steph. 225). Est enim ani- 

 morum ingeniorumque naturale quoddam quasi pabulum conside- 



