The New Morality 



which we form from the comparison of one thing 

 with another. For one and the same thing may 

 at the same time be both good and evil, or in- 

 different." I 



Here indeed, in these pregnant words, we 

 come upon the very root of the matter. A thing, 

 an action, may be called good or bad in respect to 

 a certain purpose or object ; but in itself, No. 

 Wine may be good for the encouragement of 

 sociability, but may be bad for the liver. The 

 Sabbath-day may be pronounced a beneficial 

 institution from some points of view, but not from 

 others. A scrupulous respect for private property 

 may certainly be a help to settled social life ; but 

 the practice of thieving — as recommended by 

 Plato — may be very useful to check the lust of 

 private riches. To speak of wine as in its nature 

 good or bad is manifestly absurd ; and the same 

 of a pious respect for private property or the 

 Sabbath-day. These things are good under 

 certain conditions or for certain purposes, and 

 bad under other conditions or for other purposes. 

 But of course it belongs and goes with the brute 

 externalising tendency of the mind, to stereotype 

 the actual material thing — which should be only 

 the vehicle of the spirit — and give /'/ a character 

 and a cult as good or bad. The Sabbath ceases 

 to be made for man, and man is made for the 

 Sabbath. Law, Custom, Pharisaism, and Self- 

 righteousness spring up and usurp the sphere 

 of morality, and all the histories of savage 



I Spinoza's Etkic, part iv. 

 245 



