MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 153 
amount of the former would constitute the most 
rudimentary condition of the latter, though sen- 
sations BpPly the conditions for the existence of 
_.. or ‘knowledge’ =: (pe 67): 
_ This proposition is true, or not, according to the 
nse in which the word “thought” is employed. 
Bone is not uncommonly used in a sense co- 
nsive with consciousness, and, especially, with 
hose states of consciousness we call memory. If I 
: a the impression made by acolour or an odour, 
and distinctly remember blueness or muskiness, I 
may say with perfect propriety that I “think of” 
blue or musk ; and, so long as the thought lasts, 
. it i is simply a faint reproduction of the state of 
- consciousness to which I gave the name in question, 
when it first became known to me as a sensation. 
Now, if that faint reproduction of a sensation, 
hich we call the memory of it, is properly termed 
a thought, it seems to me to be a somewhat forced 
proceeding to draw a hard and fast line of demar- 
A cation between thoughts and sensations. If sen- 
ions are not rudimentary thoughts, it may be 
| said that some thoughts are rudimentary sensations. 
- No amount of tind constitutes an echo, but for 
ao no one would pretend that an echo is some- 
thing of totally different nature from a sound. 
_ Again, nothing can be looser, or more inaccurate, 
than the assertion that “sensations supply the 
_ conditions for the existence of thought or know- 
ledge.” If this implies that sensations supply the 
- 
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aeeeeeene 
- 
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