el 
154 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS a 
conditions for the existence of our memory of sen- 
sations or of our thoughts about sensations, it is a 
truism which it is hardly worth while to state so 
solemnly. If it implies that sensations supply any- 
thing else, it is obviously erroneous. And if it 
means, as the context would seem to show it does, 
that sensations are the subj ect-matter of all thought 
or knowledge, then it is no less contrary to fact, 
inasmuch as our emotions, which constitute a large 
part of the subject-matter of thought or of inom 
ledge, are not sensations. 
More eccentric still is the Quarterly Reviewall , 
next piece of psychology. 3 
‘* Altogether, we may clearly distinguish at least six kinds of 
action to which the nervous system ministers :— 
‘*J. That in which impressions received result in appropriate 
movements without the intervention of sensation or thought, 
in the cases of injury above given.—This is the reflex action of 
the nervous system. ’ 
** TI, That in which stimuli from without result in sensations 
through the agency of which their due effects are wrought oug 
—Sensation. 
‘**TIJ. That in which impressions received result in sensations: 
which give rise to the observation of sensible objects.—Sensible 
perception. 
‘‘TV. That in which sensations and perceptions continue to 
coalesce, agglutinate, and combine in more or less complex 
aggregations, according to the laws of the association of sensible 
perceptions. —Association. 
‘*The above four groups contain only indeliberate operations, 
consisting, as they do at the best, but of mere presentative 
sensible ideas in no way implying any reflective or representative 
faculty. Such actions minister to and form Jnstinct. Besides these, 
we may distinguish two other kinds of mental action, namely :— 
