ie dein: 
MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 155 
~ 
**V. That in which sensations and sensible perceptions are 
' veflected on by thought, and recognised as our own, and we 
. 
{ 
- ourselves recognised by ourselves as affected and perceiving. — 
f-consciousness. 
~ | . . . 
- “«Y¥VJ, That in which we reflect upon our sensations or 
Z ptions, and ask what they are, and why they are.—Reason. 
_ ‘These two latter kinds of action are deliberate operations, 
performed, as they are, by means of representative ideas imply- 
ing the use of a reflective representative faculty. Such actions 
distinguish the inéellect or rational faculty. Now, we assert 
- that possession in perfection of all the first four ( presentative) 
kinds of action by no means implies the possession of the last 
__ two (representative) kinds. All persons, we think, must admit 
the truth of the following proposition :— 
‘Two faculties are distinct, not in degree but in kind, if we 
f tmay possess the one in perfection without that fact implying 
that we possess the other also. Still more will this be the case 
if the two faculties tend to increase in an inverse ratio. Yet 
_ this is the distinction between the instinctive and the intellectual 
parts of man’s nature. 
- * As to animals, we fully admit that they may possess all the 
first four groups of actions—that they may have, so to speak, 
mental images of sensible objects combined in all degrees of 
complexity, as governed by the laws of association. We deny 
to them, on the other hand, the possession of the last two kinds 
_ of mental action. We deny them, that is, the power of reflecting 
on their own existences, or of inquiring into the nature of objects 
and their causes, We deny that they know that they know or 
know themselves in knowing. ~In other words, we deny them 
reason. ‘The possession of the presentative faculty, as above 
explained, in no way implies that of the reflective faculty ; nor 
does any amount of direct operation imply the power of asking 
the reflective question before mentioned, as to ‘what’ and 
‘why.’” (Loc, cit. pp. 67, 68.) 
Sundry points are worthy of notice in this 
remarkable account of the intellectual powers, In 
the first place the Reviewer ignores emotion and 
