156 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS q 
volition, though they are no inconsiderable “ kinds 
of action to which the nervous system ministers,” 
and memory has a place in his classification only 
by implication. Secondly, we are told that the 
second “kind of action to which the nervous 
system ministers ” is “that in which stimuli from 
without result in sensations through the ageney 
of which their due effects are wrought out.— 
Sensation.” Does this really mean that, in the 
writer's opinion, “sensation” is the “agent” by 
which the “due effect” of the stimulus, whi h 
gives rise to sensation, is “wrought out”? 
Suppose somebody runs a pin into me. The 
“due effect” of that particular stimulus will 
probably be threefold; namely, a sensation of 
pain, a start, and an interjectional expletive. 
Does the Quarterly Reviewer really think that 
the “sensation” is the “agent” by which the 
other two phenomena are wrought out ? 3 
But these matters are of little moment to 
anyone but the Reviewer and those persons who 
may incautiously take their physiology, or psycho- 
logy, from him. The really interesting point is 
this, that when he fully admits that animals 
“may possess all the first four groups of actions,” 
he grants all that is necessary for the purposes of 
the evolutionist. For he hereby admits that in 
animals “ impressions received result in sensations - 
which give rise to the observation of a 
. 
objects,’ and that they have what he ca 
