t MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 157 
sensible perception.” Nor was it possible to 
| oj the admission ; for we have as much reason 
ascribe to masini as we have to attribute to 
our fellow-men, the power, not only of perceiving 
external objects as external, and thus practically 
_ recognizing the difference between the self and the 
- not-self; but that of distinguishing between like 
and unlike, and between simultaneous and suc- 
cessive things. When a gamekeeper goes out 
coursing with a greyhound in leash, and a hare 
erosses the field of vision, he becomes the subject 
of those states of consciousness we call visual 
sensation, and that is all he receives from without. 
Sensation, as such, tells him nothing whatever 
- about the cause of these states of consciousness; 
but the thinking faculty instantly goes to work 
- upon the raw material of sensation furnished to it 
through the eye, and gives rise to a train of 
thoughts. First comes the thought that there is 
an object at a certain distance; then arises 
another thought—the perception of the likeness 
between the states of consciousness awakened by 
this object to those presented by memory, as, on 
some former occasion, called up by a hare; this is 
‘succeeded by another thought of the nature of an 
- emotion—namely, the desire to possess the hare; 
then follows a longer or shorter train of other 
thoughts, which end in a volition and an act—the 
loosing of the greyhound from the leash. These 
several thoughts are the concomitants of a process 
