MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 161 
" serious objections if the evidence that animals feel 
- isinsufficient to prove that they really do so. What 
- is the value of the evidence which leads one to 
_ believe that one’s fellow-man feels? The only 
- evidence in this argument of analogy is the 
; laxity of his structure and of his actions to 
one’s own. And if that is good enough to prove 
that one’s fellow-man feels, surely it is good 
c enough to prove that an ape feels. For the differ- 
ences of structure and function between men and 
apes are utterly insufficient to warrant the 
assumption that while men have those states of 
_ Consciousness we call sensations apes have nothing 
of the kind. Moreover, we have as good BAS 
that apes are capable of emotion and volition as 
we have that men other than ourselves are. But 
if apes possess three out of the four kinds of states 
of consciousness which we discover in ourselves, 
_ what possible reason is there for denying them the 
fourth? If they are capable of sensation, emotion, 
and volition, why are they to be denied thought 
_ (in the sense of predication) ? 
No answer has ever been given to these 
questions. And as the law of continuity is as 
much opposed, as is the common sense of man- 
kind, to the notion that all animals are unconscious 
' Machines, it may safely be assumed that no 
‘sufficient answer ever will be given to them. 
_ There is every reason to believe that con- 
sciousness is a function of nervous matter, when 
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