THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES. 59 



We do not suppose that less power, or other power, 

 .'s required to sustain the universe and carry on its 

 operations, than to bring it into being. So, while 

 conceiving no improbability of " interventions of Cre- 

 ative mind in Nature," if by such is meant the bring- 

 ing to pass of new and fitting events at fitting times, 

 we leave it for profounder minds to establish, if they 

 can, a rational distinction in kind between his work- 

 ing in Nature carrying on operations, and in initiating 

 those operations. 



We wished, under the light of such views, to ex- 

 amine more critically the doctrine of this book, espe- 

 cially of some questionable parts; for instance, its 

 explanation of the natural development of organs, 

 and its implication of a " necessary acquirement of 

 mental power " in the ascending scale of gradation. 

 But there is room only for the general declaration 

 that we cannot think the Cosmos a series which began 

 with chaos and ends with mind, or of which mind is 

 a result : that, if, by the successive origination of spe- 

 cies and organs through natural agencies, the author 

 means a series of events which succeed each other 

 irrespective of a continued directing intelligence — 

 events which mind does not order and shape to des- 

 tined ends — then he has not established that doctrine, 

 nor advanced toward its establishment, but has accu- 

 mulated improbabilities beyond all belief. Take the 

 formation and the origination of the successive degrees 

 of complexity of eyes as a specimen. The treatment 

 of this subject (pp. 188, 189), upon one interpretation, 

 is open to all the objections referred to ; but, if, on 

 the other hand, we may rightly compare the eye " to 



