EVOLUTIONARY TELEOLOGY. 359 



may then say that, since the process of natural selection has 

 been understood, purpose has ceased to suggest design to in- 

 structed people, except in cases where the agency of man is 

 independently probable."— P. 0. W., in the Contemporary Re- 

 view for September, 1875, p. 657. 



The distinction made by this anonymous writer is 

 convenient and useful, and his statement clear. We 

 propose to adopt this use of the terms purpose and de- 

 sign, and to examine the allegation. The latter comes 

 to this : " Processes of natural selection " exclude " the 

 agency of an intelligence in which the image or idea 

 of the end precedes the use of the means ; " and since 

 the former have been understood u purpose has ceased] 

 to suggest design to instructed people, except in cases) 

 where the agency of man is independently probable."! 

 The maxim " I? homme propose, Dieu dispose" under 

 this reading means that the former has the monopoly 

 of design, while the latter accomplishes without de- 

 signing. Man's works alone suggest design. 



But it is clear to us that this monopoly is shared 

 with certain beings of inferior grade. Granting that 

 quite possibly the capture of flies for food by Dionwa 

 and the sundews may be attributed to purpose apart 

 from design (if it be practicable in the last resort to 

 maintain this now convenient distinction), still their 

 capture by a spider's-web, and by a swallow on the 

 wing, can hardly "cease to suggest design to in- 

 structed people." And surely, in coming at his mas- 

 ter's call, the dog fulfills his own design as well as 

 that of his master; and so of other actions and con- 

 structions of brute animals. 



Without doubt so acute a writer has a clear and 



