EVOLUTIONARY TELEOLOGY. 379 



how it is held. Darwinian evolution (whatever may- 

 be said of other kinds) is neither theistical nor non* 

 theistical. Its relations to the question of design be- 

 long to the natural theologian, or, in the larger sense, 

 to the philosopher. So long as the world lasts it will 

 probably be open to any one to hold consistently, in 

 the last resort, either of the two hypotheses, that of a 

 divine mind, or that of no divine mind. There is no 

 way that we know of by which the alternative may 

 be excluded. Viewed philosophically, the question 

 only is, Which is the better supported hypothesis of 

 the two ? 



We have only to say that the Darwinian system, 

 as we understand it, coincides well with the theistic 

 view of Nature. It not only acknowledges purpose 

 (in the Contemporary Reviewer's sense), 1 but builds 

 upon it ; and if purpose in this sense does not of 

 itself imply design, it is certainly compatible with it, 

 and suggestive of it. Difficult as it may be to con- 

 ceive and impossible to demonstrate design in a 

 whole of which the series of parts appear to be con- 

 tingent, the alternative may be yet more difficult and 

 less satisfactory. If all Nature is of a piece — as mod- 

 ern physical philosophy insists — then it seems clear 

 that design must in some way, and in some sense, 

 pervade the system, or be wholly absent from it. Of 

 the alternatives, the predication of design — special, 

 general, or universal, as the case may be — is most 

 natural to the mind ; while the exclusion of it through- 

 out, because some utilities may happen, many adapta- 

 tions may be contingent results, and no organic mal- 



1 See pp. 358, 359. 



