IX. 



DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL SENSE. 



Descent I fully subscribe to the judgment of those 



of Man, writers who maintain that, of all the differences 

 pase ' between man and the lower animals, the moral 

 sense or conscience is by far the most important. This 

 sense, as Mackintosh remarks, "has a rightful supremacy 

 over every other principle of human action " ; it is summed 

 up in that short but imperious word ought, so full of high 

 significance. It is the most noble of all the attributes of 

 man, leading him without a moment's hesitation to risk 

 his life for that of a fellow-creature ; or, after due delib- 

 eration, impelled simply by the deep feeling of right or 

 duty, to sacrifice it in some great cause. 



A moral being is one who is capable of 

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comparing his past and future actions or mo- 

 tives, and of approving or disapproving of them. We 

 have no reason to suppose that any of the lower animals 

 have this capacity ; therefore, when a Newfoundland dog 

 drags a child out of the water, or a monkey faces danger 

 to rescue its comrade, or takes charge of an orphan monk- 

 ey, we do not call its conduct moral. But in the case of 

 man, who alone can with certainty be ranked as a moral 

 being, actions of a certain class are called moral. 



