460 Evolution and Modern Philosophy 



It was, then, not entirely a foreign point of view which Darwin 

 introduced into ethical thought, even if we take no account of the 

 poetical character of the word "struggle" and of the more direct 

 adaptation, through the use and non-use of power, which Darwin also 

 emphasised. In The Descent of Man he has devoted a special 

 chapter^ to a discussion of the origin of the ethical consciousness. 

 The characteristic expression of this consciousness he found, just as 

 Kant did, in the idea of " ought " ; it was the origin of this new idea 

 which should be explained. His hypothesis was that the ethical 

 " ought " has its origin in the social and parental instincts, which, as 

 well as other instincts (e.g. the instinct of self-preservation), lie 

 deeper than pleasure and pain. In many species, not least in tiie 

 human species, these instincts are fostered by natural selection ; and 

 when the powers of memory and comparison are developed, so that 

 single acts can be valued according to the claims of the deep social 

 instinct, then consciousness of duty and remorse are possible. Blind 

 instinct has developed to conscious ethical will. 



As already stated, Darwin, as a moral philosopher belongs to the 

 school that Avas founded by Shaftesbury, and Avas afterwards repre- 

 sented by Hutcheson, Hume, Adam Smith, Comte and Spencer. His 

 merit is, first, that he has given this tendency of thought a biological 

 foundation, and that he has stamped on it a doughty character 

 in showing that ethical ideas and sentiments, rightly conceived, are 

 forces which are at work in the struggle for life. 



There are still many questions to solve. Not only does the 

 ethical development Avithin the human species contain features still 

 imexplained^ ; but we are confronted by the great problem whether 

 after all a genetic historical theory can be of decisive importance 

 here. To every consequent ethical consciousness there is a standard 

 of value, a primordial value which determines the single etliical 

 judgments as their last presupposition, and the "rightness" of this 

 basis, the "value" of this value can as little be discussed as the 

 "rationality" of our logical principles. There is here revealed a 

 possibility of ethical scepticism which evolutionistic ethics (as well 

 as intuitive or rationalistic ethics) has overlooked. No demonstra- 

 tion can show that the results of the etliical development are 

 definitive and universal. We meet here again with the important 

 opposition of systematisation and evolution. There will, I think, 

 always be an open question here, though comparative ethics, of whicli 

 we have so far only the fii-st attempts, can do much to throw light 

 on it. 



It would carry us too far to discuss all the philosophical works on 

 ethics, which have been influenced directly or indirectly by evolu- 



1 The Descent of Man, Vol. i. Ch. iii. 



2 The works of Westermarck and Ilobhouse throw new liyht on many of these features. 



