MARITIME HISTORY 



inhabitants were deserting the town. 1 On 21 June forty Dutch ships were in sight of South wold, 

 which was 'in a very distracted condition.' 2 By the end of June preparations to repulse a Dutch 

 assault were well advanced ; Harwich was occupied by regulars and the harbour defended against 

 an entrance from the sea, 3 the Suffolk militia was encamped on Walton heights, and Landguard 

 sufficiently garrisoned. According to Sir Charles Lyttelton, who was governor in 1672, the 

 commandant of 1667, Captain Nathaniel Darell, had 1,000 men, as well as IOO Ipswich seamen 

 to work the guns. 4 This was, no doubt, an exaggeration, but Darell had both soldiers and seamen, 

 because on 29 June he wrote to the earl of Arlington, the Secretary of State, denying that the 

 two services were on such bad terms that the place must fall if attacked, and incidentally repudiating 

 the accusation that he was a papist. 5 At Aldeburgh there were three companies of foot and one or 

 two troops of horse. 6 



On 30 June the earl of Oxford told Arlington that the Dutch, if they were coming at all, had 

 delayed too long, and would be unable to effect anything if they appeared. 7 Some members of the 

 Dutch Government had been very desirous in 1666 that an attack should be made on Harwich, a 

 testimonial to the value of the new dockyard ; but their information, correct or incorrect, as to the 

 strength of Landguard had caused the design to be dismissed as too perilous, although the real cause 

 for hesitation should have been not Landguard but the English fleet. That fleet was now, for the 

 moment, non-existent, and Ruiter, after his operations in the Thames and Medwav, held a council of 

 war on 30 Tune, when proposals to attack Portsmouth or Plymouth were discussed and discarded 

 in favour of Harwich and Landguard. Vice-Admiral Evertz and Rear-Admiral van Nes had already, 

 for a week, been cruising along the Suffolk coast and blockading the mouth of the Thames with 

 their squadrons; on 1 July Ruiter joined them with the main body of the fleet. Early on the 

 morning of 2 July the Dutch, 80 strong, were off Aldeburgh putting the townsmen in fear that a 

 landing there was intended ; 8 at II a.m. they were off Felixstowe, and at one o'clock 47 sail were off 

 Landguard and 8 or 9 in the Rolling Grounds. 9 An English observer notices that by two o'clock 

 1,000 troops were landed. This was in accordance with the plan decided upon at the council 

 of war, by which the assault upon Landguard was to be made by 1,000 soldiers and 400 seamen, 

 while Evertz and van Nes cannonaded the fort from two sides with their squadrons. 10 The 

 landing force was under the command of Colonel Dolman, who is said to have been an English 

 traitor. 11 In the result the two admirals did not come into action ; all the buoys and beacons had 

 been removed, and van Nes, who should have entered the harbour, went aground on the Andrews. 

 Ships had been sunk in the fairway, 12 which no doubt made the passage look uninviting to the 

 Dutch, and by the time that van Nes was ready to go forward, sounding from boats, the tide was 

 ebbing and the wind had fallen. Evertz was hampered by the sands and shoal water that cover 

 the eastern front of Landguard and extend along Felixstowe Bay, so that he did not come within 

 effective range at all. 



The accidents to the two admirals deranged the original design to deliver the assault under 

 cover of their fire. The troops and sailors were landed without difficulty at Felixstowe, and while 

 the main body formed up to advance on Landguard some five hundred men were detailed to hold in 

 check the militia lining Felixstowe cliff", who used their muskets valiantly. Time was lost in 

 waiting for Evertz and van Nes to co-operate, but when it was realized that that was hopeless it 

 was decided to proceed without them, Ruiter himself accompanying the soldiers within musket 

 range of the fort. The first assault was made about five o'clock, and seemed to an onlooker 'long 

 and tedious,' although that description is probably not one which would have fitly described the 

 passing time to the actors in the drama. It lasted about three-quarters of an hour ; the storming 

 party of seamen came on boldly with scaling ladders, hand grenades, and cutlasses under cover of 

 the fire of their comrades. 13 The garrison kept up a steady fire, and were greatly helped by two 

 small ships lying in the Salt Road, inside the harbour, which sent their shot into the shingle 

 scattering it in showers among the Dutch, although the effect was probably more moral than 

 material. The assailants were so daunted that they fell back in disorder, seeking cover in any 

 inequalities of the ground. There can be no doubt that if there had been any English force to 

 follow up the success the repulse would have been converted into a rout. As it was, the Dutch 

 officers had time to rally their men, and, about seven o'clock, led them on again to an assault, but 

 the heart had been taken out of them and this second attempt, lasting a quarter of an hour, was a 



1 S.P. Dom. Chas. II, ccvi, 47. ' Ibid. 1 26. 



3 See V.C.H. Essex, ii, ' Maritime Hist.' * S.P. Dom. Chas. II, cccxiii, 1 -4. 



5 Ibid, ccvii, 112. There is corroborative evidence of the presence of the Ipswich seamen (W. O. Ord. 

 Warrants, iii, 3 July, 1667). See V.C.H. Essex, ii, p. 294, for a plate of Harwich and Landguard, 1 710-14, 

 which must substantially represent the appearance of the fort in 1667 except that there is no reference to a 

 wet moat in any account of the attack. 6 S.P. Dom. Chas. II, ccvii, 10 ; ccviii, 24. 



'Ibid, ccvii, 131. e Ibid, ccviii, 24. B Just outside the harbour. 



10 Brandt, Vie de Michel de Ruiter, 424. " S.P. Dom. Chas. II, ccviii, 72. 



" Sec V.C.H. Essex, ii, ' Maritime Hist.' u S.P. Dom. Chas. II, ccviii, 28, 55. 



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