ON THE GENERAL DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE. 



vie-vs, I shall now proceed to illustrate the 



That a general diffusion of knowledge would 

 tend to the rapid advancement of universal act- 

 ence. 



We are placed in the midst of a scene where 

 a vast multiplicity of objects solicits our atten 

 tion. Whether we look around on the surface 

 of the earth, or penetrate into its bowels, or 

 turn our eyes upwards to the surrounding at 

 mosphere and the vault of heaven, we perceive 

 an immense variety of beings, celestial and 

 terrestrial, animated and inanimated, continu 

 ally varying their aspects and positions, all dif 

 fering from each other in certain points of view, 

 yet connected together by various relations and 

 resemblances. 



Science, in the most general and extensive 

 sense of the term, consists in a perception of 

 the resemblances and differences, or the rela 

 tions which these objects have to one another, 

 and to us as rational beings. To ascertain the 

 almost infinite number of relations which sub 

 sist among the immense variety of objects which 

 compose the material and intellectual universe, 

 requires an immense multitude of observations, 

 comparisons, and deductions to be made by a 

 vast number of observers placed in various cir 

 cumstances and positions ; or, in other * r v^n, 

 the discovery of an immense number if A-f *. 

 All science may therefore be con^H?-*^ -v 

 founded on fads and perhaps there wo f M bo 

 few exceptions to the truth of the position, were 

 we to assert, that the most sublime truths and 

 deductions, in every science, when stripped of 

 all their adventitious circumstances, simplified, 

 and expressed in the plainest and most perspi 

 cuous terms, maybe reduced to so many facts. 

 This position might be illustrated, were it ne 

 cessary, by an induction of particulars from the 

 various branches of mathematical and physical 

 science. That &quot; a whole is greater than any 

 of its parts,&quot; that &quot; the square described on 

 the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle is 

 equal to the sum of the squares described on its 

 rere*V| ^des,&quot; are facts, the one deduced 

 frwn ^fwvation or simple intuition, the other 

 frnro % aeries of comparisons. That the sun is 

 tb centre, around which the p/anetary bodies 

 wMrolve, that a projectile describes a para 

 bolic curve, that the velocities of falling bodies 

 are in proportion to the spaces run over, that 

 fluids press in all directions, that the pressure 

 of the atmosphere will support a column of 

 water to the height of above thirty feet, that 

 the elastic spring of the air is equivalent to the 

 force which compresses it, that the angle of 

 incidence of a ray of light is equal to the angle 

 of reflection, that the north pole of one mag 

 net will attract the south pole of another, that 

 the air we breathe is a composition of oxygen 

 ind nitrogen; and a variety of similar truths, 



are/ac&amp;lt;s, deduced either from simple observa 

 tion and experiment, or from a comparison of a 

 series of phenomena and experiments .vith eacn 

 other. Now, every comparison we make be 

 tween two or more objects or ideas, is an act of 

 the mind affirming a resemblance or a dis- 

 greement between the objects compared ; which 

 affirmation, if deduced from a clear view of the 

 objects presented to the mind or senses, is tha 

 declaration of a fact. 



If the above sentiments are just, it will fol 

 low, that every person possessed of an ordinary 

 share of understanding, and whose organs of 

 sensation are in a sound state, is capable of ac 

 quiring all the leading truths of the most useful 

 sciences, since he enjoys the senses and facul 

 ties requisite for the observation of facts, and 

 for comparing them with one another. And if 

 such a person is capable of receiving into his 

 mind truths already ascertained, he is also, for 

 the same reason, qualified for discovering new 

 truths or facts, provided he be placed in such 

 circumstances as shall have a tendency to pre 

 sent the objects of his pursuit in the clearest 

 point of view ; that he have an opportunity of 

 surveying them on all sides, and that his atten 

 tion be firmly riveted on their several aspects 

 and relations. That one man, therefore, excels 

 another in these respects, is chiefly owing to 

 his mind being more particularly directed to the 

 contemplation of certain objects and relations, 

 and his mental faculties concentrated upon them 

 When a person, devoted to scientific investiga 

 tion, discovers a new fact, it is not, in the ma 

 jority of instances, because he possesses powers 

 of intellect and organs of sensation superior to 

 the ordinary endowments of humanity, but be 

 cause he was placed in different circumstances, 

 and had his attention directed to different ob 

 jects, and was thus enabled to perceive rela 

 tions and combinations which had been either 

 unnoticed by others, or which were placed be 

 yond the range of their observation. Genius, 

 then, which is generally attributed to such cha 

 racters, may be considered as consisting in a 

 concentration of the rays of intellect upon any 

 particular object, art, or science, arising from a 

 lively taste we feei for that particular study. It 

 may be compared to a burning lens, where the 

 scattered rays of light are rendered powerful 

 by being collected into a point. 



In so far, then, as we are able to direct the 

 faculties of the mind however moderate a de 

 gree of vigour they may possess to the fixed 

 contemplation of scientific objects, in so far may 

 we expect that new relations will be discovered, 

 and new truths elicited. Sir Isaac Newton waa 

 one day asked, &quot; How he had discovered the 

 true system of the universe?&quot; He replied, 

 &quot; By continually thinking upon it.&quot; He was 

 frequently heard to declare, that &quot; if he had 

 done the world any service, it was due to no- 



