INFLUENCE OF KNOWLEDGE ON MORALS. 



103 



Majesty, to utter abundantly the memory of his 

 great goodness, and to speak of all his wonderful 



ws*.~\ra &quot; 



works. 



SECTION VII. 



ON THE BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF KNOW 

 LEDGE ON MORAL PRINCIPLE AND CON 

 DUCT. 



KNOWLEDGE is valuable chiefly m propor 

 tion as it is practical and useful. It dispels the 

 -iarkness which naturally broods over the human 

 understanding, and dissipates a thousand super 

 stitious notions and idle terrors by which it has 

 been frequently held in cruel bondage. It in 

 vigorates and expands the intellectual faculties, 

 and directs them to their proper objects. It 

 elevates the mind in the scale of rational exist 

 ence, by enlarging its views and refining its 

 pleasures. It gratifies the desire of the soul 

 for perpetual activity, and renders its acti 

 vities subservient to the embellishment of 

 life and the improvement of society. It un 

 veils the beauties and sublimities of nature, with 

 which the heavens and the earth are adorn 

 ed, and sets before us the &quot; Book of God,&quot; in 

 which we may trace the lineaments of his cha 

 racter and the ways of his providence. It ag 

 grandizes our ideas of the omnipotence of Deity, 

 and unfolds to us the riches of his beneficence, 

 and the depths of his wisdom and intelligence. 

 And, in the exercise of our powers on such ob 

 jects, we experience a thousand delightful emo 

 tions and enjoyments to which the unenlightened 

 multitude are entire strangers. All such acti 

 vities and enjoyments may be reckoned among 

 the practical advantages of knowledge. 



But there is no application of knowledge more 

 interesting and important than its practical bear 

 ings on moral principle and action. If it were 

 not, calculated to produce a beneficial effect oii 

 the state of morals and the intercourses of gene 

 ral society, the utility of its general diffusion 

 might, with some show of reason, be called in 

 question. But, there cannot be the slightest, 

 doubt, that an increase of knowledge would be 

 productive of an increase of moral order, and an 

 . improvement in moral conduct. For truth, in 

 thought and sentiment, leads to truth in action. 

 The man who is in the habit of investigating 

 truth, and who rejoices in it when ascertained, 

 cannot be indifferent to its application to conduct. 

 There must be truth in his actions ; they must 

 be the expression, the proof, and the effect of 

 his sentiments and affections, in order that he 

 may approve of them, and be satisfied that they 

 are virtuous, or accordant with the relations 

 which subsist among moral agents. There must 

 ikewise be a truth or harmony between his ac 



tions, so that none of them be incoherent with 

 the rest. They must all be performed on the 

 same principles, with the same designs, and by 

 the same rule. To a man who perceives truth 

 and loves it, every incongruity and every want 

 of consistency between sentiment and action, 

 produces a disagreeable and painful sensation : 

 and, consequently, he who clearly perceives the 

 rule of right, and acts in direct opposition to it, 

 does violence to his nature, and must be subject 

 ed to feelings and remorses of conscience far 

 more painful than those of the man whose mind 

 is shrouded in ignorance. It is true, indeed, 

 that proficiency in knowledge and in the prac 

 tice of true morality, do not always proceed with 

 equal pace. But, it is nevertheless true, that 

 every action that is truly virtuous is founded on 

 knowledge, and is the result of scrutiny and 

 choice directed by truth; otherwise, what is 

 termed virtue, would be only the effect of ne 

 cessity, of constraint, or of mechanical habits. 

 We need not, therefore, fear, that the dominion 

 of virtue* will be contracted, or her influence 

 diminished, by an enlargement of the kingdom 

 of light and knowledge. They are inseparably 

 connected, their empire is one and the same, 

 and the true votaries of the one will also be the 

 true votaries of the other. And, therefore, every 

 one that sincerely loves mankind and desires 

 their moral improvement,will diffuse light around 

 him as extensively as he can, w:*hout the least 

 fear of its ultimate consequences ; since he 

 knows for certain, that in all cases whatever, 

 wisdom excels folly, and light is better than 

 darkness. The following observations will per 

 haps tend more particularly to comfirm and elu 

 cidate these positions. 



1. Ignorance is one principal cause of the want 

 of virtue, and of the immoralities which abound 

 in the world. Were we to take a survey of the 

 moral state of the world, as delineated in the 

 history of nations, or as depicted by modern 

 voyugers and travellers, we should find abundant 

 illusti at ion of the truth of this remark. We 

 .should find, in almost every instance, that igno 

 rance of the character of the true God, and false 

 conceptions of the nature of the worship and 

 service he requires, have led not only to the 

 most obscene practices and immoral abomina 

 tions, but to the perpetration of the most horrid 

 cruelties. We have only to turn our eyes to 

 Hindostan, toTartary, Dahomy, Benin, Ashan- 

 tee, and other petty states in Africa ; to New 

 Zealand, the Marquesas, the Sandwich islands, 

 and to the Society isles in the Southern Pacific, 

 prior to their late moral transformation, in order 



By virtue, in this place, and wherever the term 

 occurs, I understand, conduct regulated by the law 

 of God, including both the external action and the 

 principle whence it flows ; in other words, Christian 

 morality, or that holiness which the Scripture 

 enjoin. 



