158 



ON THE GENERAL DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE. 



and the economy of the universe. Natural his 

 tory has widely enlarged its boundaries ; our 

 views of the range of the planetary system have 

 been extended ; the distant regions of the starry 

 firmament have been more minutely explored, 

 and new objects of magnificence brought within 

 the reach of our observation. The nature of 

 light has been more accurately investigated, the 

 composition of the atmosphere discovered, the 

 properties of the different, gases ascertained, the 

 powers of electricity and galvanism detected, and 

 chemistry a science completely new-modelled 

 has opened up the secret springs of nature s 

 operations, and thrown a new light on the econo 

 my of Divine wisdom in the various processes 

 which are going on in the material system. Is 

 it not unaccountable, then, that no modern sys 

 tem of Physico- Theology, embracing the whole 

 range of modern discoveries, should have pro 

 ceeded from the pens of some one or other of our 

 most distinguished philosophers? Does this cir 

 cumstance seem to indicate, that, since the early 

 part of the last century, the piety of philosophers 

 has been declining, f.nd the infidel principles of 

 the continental school gaining the ascendency? 

 Infidelity and fatalism very generally go hand in 

 hand. When (he truths of Revelation are once 

 discarded, a species of universal scepticism, dif 

 fering little or nothing from atheism, takes pos 

 session of the rnind ; and hence we find, that in 

 the writings of such men as Buffbn, Diderot, 

 and La Place, there is not the slightest reference 

 to Final Causes, or to the agency of an All-per 

 vading Mind that governs the universe. 



That the connexion between science and theo 

 logy, we have been recommending, is not a 

 vague or enthusiastic idea, appears from the 

 sentiments which have been expressed on this 

 subject by the most eminent philosophers. 

 Throughout the whole of the works of the immor 

 tal Newton, we perceive a constant attention to 

 Final causes, or to the great purposes of the 

 Deity. It was the firm opinion of this philoso 

 pher, &quot; that, as we are everywhere encountered 

 in our researches by powers and effects, which 

 are unaccountable upon any principles of mere 

 mechanism, or the combinations of matter and 

 motion, we must for ever resort to a Supreme 

 power, whose influence extends over all Nature, 

 and who accomplishes the wisest and most bene 

 volent ends by the best possible means.&quot; Mac- 

 laurin, the friend of Newton, and the commen 

 tator on his Principia, expresses the following 

 sentiments on this subject, in his &quot; Account of 

 Sir I. Newton s Discoveries.&quot; &quot; There is 

 nothing we meet with more frequently and con 

 stantly in Nature, than the traces of an all- 

 governing Deity. And the philosopher who 

 overlooks these, contenting himself with the 

 appearances of the material universe only, and 

 the mechanical laws of motion, neglects what is 

 most excellent ; and prefers what is imperfect to 



what is supremely perfect, finitude to infinity, 

 what is narrow and weak to what is unlimited 

 and almighty, and what is perishing to what en 

 dures for ever. Such who attend not to so mani 

 fest indications of supreme wisdom and good 

 ness, perpetually appearing before them wherever 

 they turn their views or inquiries, too much re 

 semble those ancient philosophers who made 

 Night, Matter, and Chaos, the original of all 

 things.&quot; Similar sentiments were expressed by 

 the late Professor Robison, one of the most pro 

 found mathematicians and philosophers of his 

 age. &quot; So far from banishing the consideration 

 of final causes from our discussions, it would look 

 more like philosophy, more like the love of true 

 wisdom, and it would taste less of an idle curi 

 osity, were we to multiply our researches in those 

 departments of nature where final causes are the 

 chief objects of our attention the structure and 

 economy of organized bodies in the animal and 

 vegetable kingdoms.&quot; &quot; It is not easy to ac 

 count for it, and perhaps the explanation would 

 not be very agreeable, why many naturalists so 

 fastidiously avoid such views of nature as tend 

 to lead the mind to the thoughts of its Author. 

 We see them even anxious to weaken every 

 argument for the appearance of design in the 

 construction and opet aliens of nature. One 

 would think, that, an the contrary, such appear- 

 ances would be most welcome, and that no 

 thing would be more dreary and comfortless than 

 the belief that chance or fate rules all the events 

 of nature.&quot; Elements of Mechanical Philoso 

 phy, vol. i. pp. 681-2. We know not whether 

 such sentiments were inculcated from the chair 

 of Natural Philosophy, which Dr. Robison so 

 long occupied, by the distinguished philosophei 

 who has lately deceased. 



II. Besides the deductions of natural religion, 

 to which we have now adverted in our scienti 

 fic instructions there ought to be a reference, on 

 every proper occasion, to the leading truths ol 

 revelation. There are many scientific inquirers 

 who would have no objections occasionally to ad 

 vert to final causes, and the wisdom of the Deity, 

 who consider it altogether irrelevant, in the dis 

 cussions of science, to make the slightest refer 

 ence to the facts and doctrines detailed in the 

 Sacred Oracles. The expediency, or the im 

 propriety of such a practice, must depend on the 

 views we take of the r.ature of the communica 

 tions which the Scriptures contain. If the Bible 

 is acknowledged as a revelation from God, its 

 truths must harmonize with the system of nature, 

 they must throw a mutual light on each other, 

 and the attributes of the Divinity they respec 

 tively unfold must be in perfect accordance; and 

 therefore it can never be irrelevant, when en 

 gaged in the study of the one, to refer for illustra 

 tions to the other. On the contrary, to omit do 

 ing so, from a fastidious compliance with what 

 has too long been the established practice, would 



